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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Cameroon is a developing country located in Central Africa. It has consecutively been 
colonised by Germany, France and Great Britain.
1
 In 1960, Cameroon became an 
independent state, thereafter a federation in 1961, then a unitary state in 1972, and finally the 
Republic of Cameroon since 1983.
2
 
 
According to African Forum on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), Cameroon is an 
influential member of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), 
and plays an important role in the affairs of the Central African sub-region.
3
 Moreover, 
Cameroon is unquestionably one of the countries which have the most to gain from the 
creation of an integrated market in the context of the regional Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the European Union.
4
 Its geographic location, economic weight and relative 
diversification of productive equipment (compared to the economic fabric of the other 
regional countries) represent many growth potentials in a context where regional trade is 
bound to witness significant development.
5
 It is bordered by six countries similarly rich in 
natural and mineral resources, namely, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Nigeria, and Republic of the Congo.
6
 
 
                                                          
1
 Awasom NF ‘Towards Historicizing the Ossification of Colonial Identities in Africa: The 
Anglophone/Francophone divide in Postcolonial Cameroon’ in Zewde B (eds) Society, State and Identity in 
African History (2008) 49. 
2
 Awasom NF ‘The Reunification Question in Cameroon History: Was the Bride an Enthusiastic or a Reluctant 
One?’(2000) 47 Indiana University Press 90-119, 91. 
3
AFRODAD A critical Assessment of Aid Management and Donors Harmonization: the Case of Cameroon 
(2007) Report of the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development, 15. 
4
 AFRODAD A critical Assessment of Aid Management and Donors Harmonization: the Case of Cameroon 
(2007) Report of the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development, 15. 
5
 Tangwa GB ‘Cameroon’ in Handbook of Global Bioethics (2014) 1-942. 
6
 See information on Cameroon available at http://www.camhicom.co.za/cameroon.php (accessed 19 March 
2014). 
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From 1960 to 1985 the country was amongst the most prosperous in Africa.
7
 However, 
during the fiscal year 1986/1987, Cameroon experienced a drop in commodity prices for its 
principal exports, namely, oil, cocoa, coffee and cotton.
8
 In the mid-1980s, this combined 
with an overvalued currency and economic mismanagement led to a decade long recession.
9
 
Cameroon, like almost all African countries, is characterised by extreme poverty,
10
 under-
development, lack of infrastructure, maladministration, corruption, bad governance, low 
growth rate, high unemployment rate, high rate of HIV/AIDS, violations of human rights, 
non-respect for human dignity, non-respect for democracy, lack of transparency in the 
election process, and ineffective separation of powers.
11
  
 
As Cameroon is signatory to various international human rights instruments, such as, the 
UDHR, the ICCPR, the Declaration on the Right to Development, the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the ICESCR it puts on the 
international community the international obligation to assist Cameroon to resolve its 
development challenges.
12
 
                                                          
7
 Atyi ER ‘Cameroon’s Logging Industry: Structure, Economic Importance and Effects of Devaluation’ 1998 
Center for International Forestry Research‘s occasional Paper No 14, 15. 
8
 Hussain NM & Gunter BG ‘External Shocks and the HIPC Initiative Impacts on Growth and Poverty in 
Africa’ (2005) 17 African Development Review 461-492, 463. 
9
 AFRODAD A critical Assessment of Aid Management and Donors Harmonization: the Case of Cameroon 
(2007) Report of the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development, 15. 
10
 Forty percent of the population are still living below the poverty line, that is, less than one dollar a day, which 
is unacceptable, having regard to the myriad of international instruments ratified by Cameroon to promote the 
dignity and the development of its population such as, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 
(1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)(1966) and the Declaration on the Right to Development (1986). 
11
 Akoko RM ‘New Pentecostalism in the Wake of the Economic Crisis in Cameroon’ (2002)11 Nordic Journal 
of African Studies 359-376, 359-360.Also Shey P ‘Cameroon: Challenges for Regional Economy’Cameroon 
Tribune 24 June 2008 available at http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/16833.html (accessed: 27 August 2012). 
12
 See Cameroon treaty membership available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=CM#a6 
(accessed 19 March 2014). 
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Under the existing international human right instruments, the international community in its 
totality has agreed upon the right of every single human being and state to economic 
development.
13
 For instance Article 2(1) of the ICESCR states: 
 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.’ 
 
This means that development issues are no longer specific concerns of each state but rather 
international matters calling for both domestic and collective efforts. Likewise Article 3(3) of 
the Declaration to the Right to Development emphasises: 
 
‘States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating 
obstacles to development. States should realize their rights and fulfil their duties in such a 
manner as to promote a new international economic order based on sovereign equality, 
interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States, as well as to encourage 
the observance and realization of human rights.’ 
 
Consequently, the international community under the international legislation has the full 
obligation and responsibility to assist developing countries as a whole with resolving their 
development challenges.
14
 In this regard Western and European Countries that are members 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), mainly France 
and Germany, are delivering foreign development aid to Cameroon.
15
 Similarly, Cameroon is 
receiving multilateral development assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
16
 
 
The OECD development assistance is always subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, 
such as, the implementation of democratic institutions, good governance practice, structural 
adjustment, privatisation, and openness to globalisation, in order to achieve development 
                                                          
13
 See the Preamble of the UDHR (10 December 1948). See also the Article 2 of the ICESCR (16 December 
1966). Moreover, Article 3 & 4 of the Declaration on the Right to Development (4 December 1986),  
14
 Article 4 of the Declaration on the Right to Development (4 December 1986). 
15
 The OECD mission is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social wellbeing of people 
around the world. 
16
 AFRODAD A critical Assessment of Aid Management and Donors Harmonization: the Case of Cameroon 
(2007) Report of the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development, 18. 
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objectives.
17
 The achievement of these development objectives consists, first, in poverty 
tackling
18
 and achieving economic growth; secondly, in achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015
19
; and, lastly, by improving market access and 
enhancing the participation of developing countries, particularly Developing Countries, in the 
Multilateral Trading System.
20
 Following the repeated failures of the OECD development 
assistance approach, several international actions and summits have been held to improve aid 
transparency and mutual accountability of donors and recipients.
21
 According to African 
Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), these efforts comprise the 
development of Poverty Reduction Strategies, followed in 2000 by the adoption of the 
MDGs, the Monterrey Consensus (March, 2002), the High-level Forum on Aid 
Harmonisation in Rome (February 2003), the Round Table on Aid Management centred on 
results in terms of development held in Marrakech (2004), the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness of February 2005, the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in 
Accra in September 2008, and the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in 
Busan in Korea in November 2011.
22
 All these international agreements define the goals and 
objectives for the agenda of aid effectiveness. 
                                                          
17
 See generally Santiso C ‘Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality’ 
(2001)7 Journal of Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of John’s Hopkins University 1-22. 
See also Jubilee USA Network Are IMF and World Bank Economic Policy Conditions undermining the Impacts 
of Debt Cancellation? (2008) Jubilee USA Network Briefing Note. 
18
 Poverty rate in Cameroon is still high as 40% of the population lived below the poverty line. 
19
 There are eight MDGs recognised by the 192 United Nations members in order to end poverty by 2015. 
Amongst them are the reduction of extreme poverty, reduction of child mortality rates, fighting disease 
epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS, and creating a global partnership for development. 
20
 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund impose a series of reforms and conditionalities because 
they firmly believe, like Burnside: Dollar and Unicef (2009), that aid works better in a ‘Good policy 
environment’. This argument is based upon the assumption that good governments are likely to use aid more 
appropriately and efficiently (pursuing the welfare of their populations rather than their own selfish and egoistic 
goals) than bad governments. See also IMF and World Bank Support Cameroon's Completion Point under the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative and the IMF Immediately Grants 100 Percent Debt Relief to Cameroon under the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (2006) Press Release No. 06/85. 
21
 AFRODAD A Critical Assessment of Aid Management & Donor Harmonisation: the Case of Cameroon 
(2007) A Report of the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development, 12. 
22
 AFRODAD A Critical Assessment of Aid Management & Donor Harmonisation: the Case of Cameroon 
(2007) A Report of the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development, 12. 
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Just like the OECD donors, the IMF and the World Bank through the HIPC Initiative have 
always attached conditionalities
23
 because they strongly believes that the imposition of rules 
and regulations under which aid is disbursed ultimately influences its success or failure.
24
 
Regarding the conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the IMF in order to receive 
foreign aid under the HIPC Initiative, it was required that Cameroon and the other poor 
countries that qualified for the HIPC Initiative achieve the following two steps: the decision 
point (phase after which a country may be granted interim debt relief) and the completion 
point phase (whereby the country benefits from full debt relief).
25
 
 
However, the HIPC Initiative framework has been at the centre of several criticisms.
26
 Some 
of these include the following: the HIPC Initiative did not provide long-term growth 
sustainability for many of the poorest countries, the HIPC Initiative framework is unlikely to 
achieve the MGDS by 2015 according to the United Nations (UN) projections, and its 
projections were ‘too optimistic’, its analysis of debt sustainability was inappropriate, and its 
country selection too narrow.
27
 
 
On the other hand, being ‘the world’s second largest economy’28 and the largest new investor, 
trader, buyer, and aid donor in African countries,
29
 China is increasing its diplomatic and 
                                                          
23
 Conditionalities are not a new phenomenon. In order to benefit from the Marshall Plan for the Reconstruction 
of Europe after the devastation of World War II, the USA government required European governments to draw 
up an economic revival plan. 
24
 See generally the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). 
25
 Thirty-two countries including Cameroon successfully reached the completion point in 2006 and were eligible 
to receive full debt relief as from December 2011. 
26 Easterly W ‘How Did Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Become Heavily Indebted? Reviewing Two Decades 
of Debt Relief’ (2002) 30 World Development 1677-1696, 1677. 
27
 See Gunter BG Does the HIPC Initiative Achieve its Goal of Debt Sustainability? (2001) Discussion paper of 
the World Institute for Development Economics Research No 2001/100, 1. See also Tiwari S & Lewis J Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) Statistical Update 
(2013) A publication Prepared by Staffs of the World Bank and the IMF, 14. 
28
 Li X & Shaw TM ‘Same Bed, Different Dreams’ and ‘Riding Tiger’ Dilemmas: China’s Rise and 
International Relations/political Economy’ (2014) 19 Journal of Chinese political science 69-93, 70. 
29
 See generally Ayenagbo K, Rongcheng W, et al ‘Sino-Africa economic and trade relation: Its Implications on 
the African Continent’ (2012) 6 African Journal of Business Management 6420-6427.See also generally Cheng 
JYS & SHI H ‘China Africa Policy in the post-Cold War Era’ (2009) 39 Journal of Contemporary Asia 87-115. 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
economic and trade relations with the African continent.
30
 In January 1960 Cameroon 
established diplomatic relations with Taiwan and later established diplomatic relations with 
the People’s Republic of China on March 1971.31 Since then, Cameroon and China have both 
entered into various multilateral agreements, amongst which are:  
 the 1972 General Trade Agreement 
 the 1997Agreement for the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investment and 
 the 2002 Agreement for Economic and Commercial Co-operation.32 
 
According to the Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid, China is delivering aid to African 
countries without political conditions attached
33
 and sees its relationship with Africa more as 
a ‘friendship’ relationship than a ‘donor-recipient’ relationship.34 Moreover, China claims 
that its development assistance approach is aligned with international legal instruments and 
featuring equality, mutual benefit and win-win co-operation.
35
 
 
However, just like the HIPC Initiative, the Chinese White Paper was not exempt from 
criticisms.
36
 For instance, China’s development assistance approach has been heavily 
criticised for not imposing political conditionalities on African countries (well known as 
corrupt and badly governed states) as the OECD donors and the IMF and the World Bank do, 
which undermine their development efforts’ effectiveness.37 Moreover, China’s development 
                                                          
30
 Jansson J The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (2009) A Briefing paper of the Centre for 
Chinese studies of the University of Stellenbosch, 4. 
31
 Taiwan is an island claiming independence from China as a distinct state. Unfortunately, the international 
community has never recognised Taiwan as such, but has only acknowledged China as the sole and unique 
official government of Taiwan as its territory. 
32
 Jansson J Patterns of Chinese Investment, Aid and Trade in Central Africa (Cameroon, DRC and Gabon) 
(2009) A Briefing paper of the Centre of Chinese Studies, 4. 
33
 In opposition to the IMF and the World Bank conditionalities earlier mentioned imposed on eligible HIPCs 
countries under the HIPC Initiative in order to benefit from full debt relief assistance. 
34
 China White Paper on Foreign Aid (22 April 2011). 
35
 The Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) Article 3(3), the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on 
China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) (2004) Article 5, and China White Paper on Foreign Aid (22 April 2011).  
36
 Condon M ‘China in Africa: What the Policy of Non-intervention Adds to the Western Development 
Dilemma’ (2012) 27 PRAXIS the Fletcher Journal of Human Security 5-25, 8. 
37
 Dreher A & Fuchs A Rogue Aid? The Determinants of China’s Aid Allocation (2011) Cesifo working paper, 
11. 
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assistance approach has been criticised, inter alia, for the following reasons: not being 
transparent, not respecting human rights, supporting corrupt and undemocratic governments, 
tying aid to procurement, and targeting access to natural resources and markets for Chinese 
exports.
38
 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
Traditional donors from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD 
community have for more than 50 years invested billions of dollars  in Africa in general and 
Cameroon in particular.
39
 Despite this huge investment, not much has been achieved with 
regard to Cameroon’s economic development to the point that questions have been posed as 
to where the money is going.
40
 This situation has raised the concerns of the international 
community in general and in particular of the traditional donors, African countries about 
traditional donors’ aid policy effectiveness on the African continent and international 
financial institutions as well.
41
  
 
According to the IMF and the World Bank reports on Cameroon’s HIPC Initiative 
Agreement, it is clear that the HIPC Initiative has brought incontestably some positive 
outcomes in Cameroon’s economic development with regard to debt burden reduction, the 
fight against corruption, good governance, improvement of education, and macro-economic 
stability.
42
 However, the HIPC Initiative has remained a limited framework given that it did 
                                                          
38
Dreher A & Fuchs A Rogue Aid? The Determinants of China’s Aid Allocation (2011) Cesifo working paper, 
11. 
39
 Easterly W & Pfutze T ‘Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid’ (2008) 22 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 29-52, 29.See also Delfin SGO & Page JM Africa at a Turning Point: 
Growth, Aid and External Shocks (2008) 2. 
40
 Easterly W & Pfutze T ‘Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid’ (2008) 22 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 29-52, 29. 
41
 Easterly W & Pfutze T ‘Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid’ (2008) 22 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 29-52, 29. 
42
 See Box on status of triggers for reaching the floating completion point sourced from Cameroon: Enhanced 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative-Completion Point Document and Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) (2006) IMF Country Report No 06/190, 6. See also IMF and World Bank Support 
Cameroon's Completion Point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative and the IMF Immediately Grants 100 Per 
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not achieve all its projected and anticipated results with regard to Cameroon poverty 
reduction and debt sustainability.
43
  
 
China’s engagement with Africa generally has to some extent brought tangible, concrete, 
visible assets on the ground.
44
 For example, China is building numerous infrastructures in 
Africa and in Cameroon, such as, hospitals, roads, schools, the Yaoundé Conference Centre, 
and the Cameroonian congress building which have improve the socio-economic life of the 
population.
45
 
 
However, just like the HIPC Initiative Agreement, China’s development assistance is still far 
away from perfection. Generally China’s development assistance approach is criticised for 
undermining human rights issues, good governance, and democracy.
46
 Cameroonians 
particularly perceive China’s development assistance as an instrument of economic policy by 
which China invades the country with cheap imported goods of low quality to make its own 
profit while domestic industries are destroyed.
47
 In the same vein, they also believe that 
China’s aid in Cameroon is not genuine but instead is targeting a market for mineral 
resources which it lacks for its industrial development.
48
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cent Debt Relief to Cameroon under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (2006) Press Release No. 06/85 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr0685.htm (accessed 11 November 2013). 
43
 See Gunter BG Does the HIPC Initiative Achieve its Goal of Debt Sustainability? (2001) Discussion Paper of 
the World Institute for Development Economics Research No 2001/100, 1. 
44
 Jansson J Patterns of Chinese Investment, Aid and Trade in Central Africa (Cameroon, DRC and Gabon) 
(2009) Briefing Paper of the Centre of Chinese Studies, 7. 
45
 Jansson J Patterns of Chinese Investment, Aid and Trade in Central Africa (Cameroon, DRC and Gabon) 
(2009) Briefing Paper of the Centre of Chinese Studies, 7. 
46
 Brautigam D China’s African Aid: Transatlantic Challenges (2008) Report to the German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, 5. 
47
 Lundsgaard H Western and Chinese Development Assistance in Tanzania: A Comparison of Approaches 
Followed by an Evaluation from Tanzanian Perspective (Published LLM thesis of Berne University, 2010) 206, 
3. 
48
 Brautigam D China’s African Aid: Transatlantic Challenges (2008) A Report to the German Marshall Fund, 
5. 
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1.3 Research questions 
 
In line with the aforementioned this mini-thesis principally investigates the following 
research questions: 
Question 1: What is the legal framework of the HIPC Initiative approach of the IMF-World 
Bank?  
Question 2 What is the normative framework of China’s development assistance approach in 
Cameroon?  
Question 3: Which development assistance regulatory framework is more aligned with 
international obligations pertaining to human rights and economic cooperation? 
 
1.4 Aims of the research 
 
This research acknowledges that although literature abounds on development assistance in 
general, not much has been published yet on Cameroon specifically. Therefore, this mini-
thesis seeks to contribute to fill this gap. Moreover, it aims to examine both development 
assistance legislative frameworks in Cameroon and above all to compare them in order to 
find out which development assistance approach is the most aligned in terms of international 
obligations relative to human rights and economic development. 
 
1.5 Limitation of the research 
 
The IMF-World Bank’s Comprehensive Approach to debt Reduction, (the HIPC Initiative), 
and China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid have been specifically chosen for this research for 
two main reasons: first, these two international instruments are significantly impacting upon 
and reshaping Cameroon’s political, social and economic development architecture since 
Cameroon economic crisis exists till today; and secondly, to enlighten the public, 
academicians, policy makers, on development assistance in Cameroon given that legal 
sources on the topic exist but mostly unpublished and inaccessible Therefore this research 
will be restricted to the period from Cameroon’s economic crisis in 1980 up to 2014. 
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Given the limited availability of primary legal sources at both the international and domestic 
levels, this research will primarily look at HIPC Initiative Agreement and the Chinese White 
Paper on Foreign Aid. Moreover, this study will be conducted in form of the available HIPC 
documents and reports on Cameroon regularly published by the staff of IMF and the World 
Bank and specifically the HIPC Decision Point Document and the HIPC Completion Point 
Document of Cameroon. In addition, this study will rely on primary legal sources relative to 
states international obligations regarding human rights and economic cooperation such as, the 
UDHR (10 December 1948), the ICCPR (16 December 1966), the ICESCR (16 December 
1966) and the Declaration on the Right to Development (4 December 1986). In the case of 
China’s development assistance approach, given that neither China nor Cameroon release 
specific bilateral treaties or agreements related to their development co-operation and the fact 
that documents and publications relative to Cameroon’s development assistance are mostly 
unpublished and inaccessible, this study will principally focus on the Chinese White Paper on 
Foreign Aid. It will also look, amongst others, at the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC 
(2004), the White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Co-operation (August 2013). 
Moreover this research will be complemented through secondary sources such as books, 
journals articles, report, working papers, press reviews, drafts, deliberation of international 
conferences and international summits, and internet sources. 
 
1.6 Overview of chapters 
 
This thesis is structured into five chapters.  
 
Chapter 1 presents an introduction to this research. 
 
Chapter 2 first examines the legal framework of the HIPC Initiative Agreement with regard 
to states’ international obligations regarding human rights and economic co-operation. It 
further investigates the eligibility criteria under the HIPC Initiative, its objectives, the 
conditionalities attached to the HIPC debt relief allocation, the criticisms encountered, and 
the challenges and achievements of the HIPC Initiative Agreement in general and in 
Cameroon in particular. 
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Chapter 3 studies the legal framework of China’s development assistance approach in 
Cameroon with regard to states’ international obligations, the Chinese White Paper on 
Foreign Aid, the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC, and the White Paper on China-Africa 
Economic and Trade Co-operation. It further discusses the motivation behind China’s 
development aid; and the criteria of China’s aid allocation, its objectives and features. 
Moreover, it examines the criticisms and the challenges and further assesses the impact of the 
Chinese development assistance approach in Cameroon. 
 
Chapter 4 first compares the HIPC Initiative Agreement with the Chinese White Paper on 
Foreign Aid in Cameroon; in terms of their differences and their similarities. Furthermore, it 
examines the benefits Cameroon is reaping from China’s development assistance and the 
IMF-World Bank’s approach to debt relief. At last, it investigates which development 
assistance regulatory framework is more aligned with international obligations pertaining to 
human rights and economic co-operation? 
 
Chapter 5 draws conclusions from the four preliminary chapters. Moreover, the chapter puts 
stress on a series of recommendations for both development assistance approaches for the 
sustainable development of Cameroon. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVE 
AGREEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The existence of an excessive external debt burden has increasingly been acknowledged by 
the international community as an obstruction to the ability of poor countries to pursue 
sustainable development and poverty reduction.
49
 In response, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank together launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative Agreement in 1996.
50
 This legal document marked an outstanding shift in 
the development finance regime because its supporting agenda aimed at resolving the long-
lasting debt crisis in a sustainable way by associating ‘debt relief with the policy 
environment, conditionality with ownership, and social impacts of macroeconomic policy 
reforms with public expenditure prioritisation.’51 The HIPC Initiative Agreement was 
supported by about 180 governments mobilised at the World Bank and the IMF and regarded 
by them as a satisfactory and valuable instrument capable of providing poor countries with 
the ultimate solution to their unremitting debt rescheduling.
52
 Since then, the international 
financial community, as well as multilateral organisations and governments, have worked 
jointly to reduce to acceptable levels the external debt burdens of the most heavily indebted 
poor countries.
53
 
 
                                                          
49
 Trotsenburg A & MacArthur A The HIPC Initiative: delivering Debt to the Poor countries (1999) 
International Monetary Fund Publication, 1. 
50
 ‘Debt Relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative’ International Monetary Fund 
Factsheet available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (accessed 21 September 2012). Also  
Gautam M Debt Relief for the Poorest: An OED Review of the HIPC Initiative (2003) 1. 
51
 Gilman M & Mitchells W ‘Achievements to Date and Challenges Ahead: A view from the IMF’ in 
Bhattacharya A, Dijkstra G et al HIPC Debt Relief: Myths and Reality (2004) A Publication of Forum on Debt 
and Development (FONDAD), 73. 
52
 Trotsenburg A & MacArthur A The HIPC Initiative: delivering Debt to the Poor Countries (1999) 
International Monetary Fund Publication, 1. 
53
 According to the IMF Factsheet Debt Relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries of 10 January 2013, 
out of the 36 countries approved under the HIPC debt reduction packages, 30 are African countries. 
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According to the HIPC Initiative Agreement framework, it was designed to successfully 
deliver on all its promises.
54
 But on the ground it brought mitigated outcomes.
55
 
Notwithstanding the IMF and World Bank statements of the HIPC Initiative’s successes, it is 
widely recognised that the HIPC Initiative Agreement as well as Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) have only partially achieve their stated objectives.
56
 Till today they have 
not effectively reduced poverty neither did they achieve debt sustainability as stated in both 
agreements.
57
 As a matter of fact, the HIPC Initiative Agreement did not achieve long-term 
debt sustainability in poor countries, of which Cameroon has not been an exception.
58
 Thus, 
the question arises as to what could be the reasons behind the HIPC Initiative Agreement’s 
moderate results in most HIPCs in general and in Cameroon particularly? Moreover, what are 
some of the achievements of the HIPC Initiative Agreement in Cameroon? What are the 
remaining challenges? What should be recommended for the way forward? 
 
A proper understanding of this chapter first requires paying particular attention to a critical 
appraisal of the role of the IMF and the World Bank in the world before homing in on the 
HIPC Initiative Agreement in terms of its historical development. Then, the second section 
will look at the main objectives and the key features of the HIPC Initiative Agreement. The 
third section will examine the eligibility criteria of countries under the HIPC Initiative 
Agreement while the fourth section will deal with the HIPC Initiative Agreement phases. The 
last section will legally assess the implementation of the HIPC Initiative Agreement against 
its background and with regard to states’ obligations pertaining to international co-operation 
and human rights as enshrined in international legal instruments. Thus, this section will look 
                                                          
54
 The HIPC Initiative: Progress and Prospects (2003) Précis World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 
No. 230, 2. 
55
 Gautam M Debt Relief for the Poorest: An OED Review of the HIPC Initiative (2003) 1. 
56
 Structural adjustment programs were the earliest solutions proposed by the World Bank and the IMF in 1980 
to poor indebted countries to tackle their debt problem, alleviate poverty and facilitate their sustainable 
development. See also Gunter BG Does the HIPC Initiative Achieve its Goal of Debt Sustainability? (2001) 
Discussion paper of the World Development Economic Research No 2001/100, 1. See also Peet R Unholy 
Trinity: the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO (2003) 100. 
57
 Cohen D ‘The HIPC Initiative: True and False Promises’ (2001) 4 International Finance 363-380, 380. 
58
 Gunter BG Does the HIPC Initiative Achieve its Goal of Debt Sustainability? (2001) Discussion paper of the 
World Development Economic Research No 2001/100, 1. 
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at the criticisms encounters by the HIPC Initiative Agreement, its positive outcomes and its 
remaining challenges. 
 
2.2 The role of the World Bank and the IMF in the world: a critical appraisal 
 
Also known as the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank and the IMF were created on 
22 July 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference, formally known as the United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference, which gathered 730 delegates from all 44 Allied nations 
at the Mount Washington Hotel, situated in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States, 
to regulate the international monetary and financial order after the conclusion of World War 
II.
59
 According to the Bretton Woods Committee, the IMF is ‘[a]n international organization 
working to maintain global financial stability through technical assistance, training, and loans 
to member states.’60 Furthermore, it defines the World Bank as ‘[a]n international 
organization … which provides vital financial and technical assistance to developing 
countries around the world to reduce global poverty.’61 The IMF factsheet on the IMF and the 
World Bank states that they share ‘the same goal of raising living standards in their member 
countries. Their approaches to this goal are complementary, with the IMF focusing on 
macroeconomic issues and the World Bank concentrating on long-term economic 
development and poverty reduction.’62 It further mentions that both institutions collaborate on 
a range of issues, such as: debt burden reduction, poverty reduction, the monitoring of 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) progress and financial stability assessment.
63
 
                                                          
59
 See generally Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial  
Conference Bretton woods, New Hampshire July 1-22, 1944 vol. i. 
60
 See the ‘Bretton Woods Institutions’ available at http://www.brettonwoods.org/page/about-the-bretton-
woods-institutions (accessed 11 April 2014).  
61
 See the ‘Bretton Woods Institutions’ available at http://www.brettonwoods.org/page/about-the-bretton-
woods-institutions (accessed 11 April 2014). 
62
 See the ‘IMF Factsheet on the IMF and World Bank’ available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/imfwb.htm (accessed 10 April 2014). 
63
 See the ‘IMF Factsheet on the IMF and the World Bank’ available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/imfwb.htm (accessed 10 April 2014). 
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According to Calomiris these multilateral financial institutions have the following five 
objectives in developing countries: improving global capital market liquidity; alleviating 
poverty in the poorest nations; promoting effective institutional reforms in the legal and 
financial systems of developing countries that favour development; providing effective global 
public health, for instance, the IMF and the World Bank put in place programs dealing with 
malaria and AIDS and environmental risks in developing countries; and collecting and 
disseminating valuable economic data in a uniform and timely manner.
64
 Moreover the IMF 
factsheet states that the purpose of the IMF is to promote ‘international monetary co-
operation and provides policy advice and technical assistance to help countries build and 
maintain strong economies’. It further mentions that  ‘the Fund also makes loans and helps 
countries design policy programs to solve balance of payments problems when sufficient 
financing on affordable terms cannot be obtained to meet net international payments.’65 For 
instance, in the Cameroon context, the IMF has provided loans to Cameroon during the 
economic crisis of 1986 under Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and under the HIPC 
Initiative.
66
 
 
Nowadays, the IMF and the World Bank have become more powerful than its founders could 
have ever imagined.
67
 Both institutions account for more than 170 member countries whose 
voting power is dictated by the amount of their subscriptions.
68
 This operating system of ‘one 
dollar -one vote’ implies that the rich developed countries lead these institutions, while poor 
countries which account for the great majority in these institutions are totally excluded from 
                                                          
64
 Calomiris C W ‘When will Economics guide IMF and World Bank Reforms’ (2000) 20 Cato Journal 85-103, 
86. 
65
 See the ‘IMF Factsheet on the IMF and the World Bank’ available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/imfwb.htm (accessed 10 April 2014). 
66
 AFRODAD A Critical Assessment of Aid Management and Donor Harmonisation: the Case of Cameroon 
(2007) A publication of AFRODAD, 16. 
67
 Khor M Globalization and the South: Some Critical Issues (2000) United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development discussion paper No 147, 9. 
68
 Leech D & Leech R ‘Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions’ in Paloni A & Zanardi M(eds) The 
IMF, World Bank and Policy Reform (2006) 27. 
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the decision making process.
69
 Consequently, the IMF and the World Bank have been 
generally described in the available literature as ‘anti- democratic’, ‘anti-poor,’ and that their 
policies are shaped by their principal stakeholders, the powerful developed countries.
70
 
Today, the IMF and the World Bank have the power to restructure national economic policy 
frameworks in many countries.
71
 In the Cameroon context, during the economic crisis the 
World Bank and the IMF first imposed on Cameroon a Structural Adjustment Programme in 
the period 1987-1997.
72
 According to African Forum on Debt and Development 
(AFRODAD), despite these interventions the burden of the external debt remained 
unsustainable, with debt stock totalling US$7802 million in nominal terms by end of June 
1999.
73
 The Cameroonian government had to design a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP), implementation of which started in 1997 after validation by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, within the framework of the HIPC Initiative.
74
 The PRSP was reconsidered and 
reframed as the Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP) in June 2008. Besides this, 
an extensive programme has been launched to fight corruption.
75
 Since, the IMF and the 
World Bank have the power to restructure national economic policy frameworks in many 
countries, 
76
 when Cameroon became eligible under the HIPC, the IMF and the World Bank 
                                                          
69
 Khor M ‘The globalisation process’ in Globalization and the South: Some Critical Issues United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development discussion Paper No 147, 3-9. 
70
 Petchesky RP Global Prescriptions: Gendering Health and Human Rights (2003) 144. 
71
 Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching Economic Policy 
Conditions to Aid (2006) Oxfam Briefing paper.  
72
 AFRODAD Mapping Chinese Development Assistance in Cameroon: An Analysis of the Experiences of 
Cameroon (2011) A report of African Forum Network on Debt and Development, 13. 
73
 AFRODAD Mapping Chinese Development Assistance in Cameroon: An Analysis of the Experiences of 
Cameroon (2011) A report of African Forum Network on Debt and Development, 13. 
74
 AFRODAD Mapping Chinese Development Assistance in Cameroon: An Analysis of the Experiences of 
Cameroon (2011) A report of African Forum Network on Debt and Development, 13. 
75
 AFRODAD Mapping Chinese Development Assistance in Cameroon: An Analysis of the Experiences of 
Cameroon (2011) A report of African Forum Network on Debt and Development, 13. 
76
 Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching Economic Policy 
Conditions to Aid (2006) Oxfam Briefing paper. 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
imposed on Cameroon a series of economic reforms which had to be satisfactorily 
implemented before Cameroon could receive full assistance.
77
  
 
Furthermore, the IMF and the World Bank fundamentally regulate countries’ macro-
economic policies; they draw central bank policies and public expenditure through the so-
called ‘Public Expenditure Review’.78 Under its ‘Public Investment Program’ the IMF even 
chooses what type of infrastructure should be built, while an imposed system of international 
tender ensures that public works projects are executed by international construction and 
engineering firms.
79
 The incapacity of many poor countries to pay back their debt has made 
them dependent on new loans.
80
 In the Cameroon context, this consequently generated the 
economic crisis and the government embarked upon a series of economic reforms initiated by 
the World Bank and IMF in the late 1980s.
81
  
 
Besides, the IMF has the power to proclaim whether a country is creditworthy or not.
82
 This 
means that in order to acquire a loan approval, countries ought to accept the conditions of 
SAPs. 
83
 Additionally, Khor argues that countries have to reform their economies in line with 
the IMF/World Bank guidelines, if they do not, they will have practically no chance to 
acquire loans from private or public creditors anywhere.
84
 
                                                          
77
 See the status of steps for reaching the floating completion point, in Cameroon: Enhanced Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative-Completion Point Document and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) 
(2006) IMF Country Report No 06/190, 6. 
78
 Khor M ‘The globalisation process’ in Globalisation and the South: Some Critical Issues United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development discussion Paper No 147, 5. 
79
 Chan C, Forwood D, Rooper H et al Public Infrastructure Financing: an International Perspective (2009) An 
Australian Government Productivity Commission Staff Working Paper, 11. 
80
 See generally Easterly W ‘Was Development Assistance a Mistake?’ (2007) 97 The American Economic 
Review, 328-332. 
81
 AFRODAD Mapping Chinese Development assistance in Cameroon: An Analysis of the Experiences of 
Cameroon (2011) A report of Forum Network on Debt and Development, 13. 
82
 Peet R Unholy Trinity: the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO (2003) 101. 
83
 Peet R Unholy Trinity: the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO (2003) 101. 
84
 Khor M Globalisation and the South: Some Critical Issues (2000) United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development discussion Paper N0 147, 3-9. 
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According to Stiglitz, these powerful multilateral financial institutions have sometimes failed 
to meet some of their goals, such as, poverty reduction, and the implementation of lending 
conditions in developing countries in general as has also been acknowledged by various 
studies and reports conducted by the IMF and the World Bank themselves.
85
 In the same vein 
Calomiris declared that the IMF and the World Bank have in some instances ‘…failed to 
achieve their goals even by their own internal measures. Studies of the extent to which the 
IMF succeeds in enforcing its lending conditions show a poor track record.’86 Therefore, the 
question arises as to what could be the possible reasons impeding the complete success of the 
IMF and the World Bank programmes in developing countries? According to some scholars 
and experts, some of the deficiencies of the IMF and the World Bank programmes come from 
the fact that the IMF and the World Bank’s objectives are evolving with time and create at 
the end a multiplicity of obligations which cannot be handled properly by these institutions in 
a short time frame.
87
 Others believe that the IMF and the World Bank programmes failed at 
times because they implement inappropriate policy responses to contemporary problems 
combined with the fact that the agendas of both financial institutions are drawn by the 
powerful member states of these institutions who created them and are principally financing 
them.
88
 
 
2.3 Historical development of the HIPC Initiative Agreement 
 
The Latin America crisis of the 1980s, combined with the politico-socio-economic instability 
it engendered by the mid-1990s, made clear that the developing countries, mostly located in 
Africa, were facing an unbearable external debt burden.
89
 Teunissen was amongst the first 
                                                          
85
 Stiglitz J ‘Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: Governance and 
Accountability’ (2003) 16 Governance: an International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institution 111-
139, 113. 
86
 Calomiris CW ‘When will Economics guide IMF and World Bank Reforms’ (2000) 20 Cato Journal 85-103, 
87. 
87
 Stiglitz J ‘Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: Governance and 
Accountability’ (2003) 16 Governance: an International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institution 111-
139, 113.See also Woods N The Globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank and their Borrowers (2006) 1. 
88
 Woods N The Globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank and their Borrowers (2006) 3. 
89
 Njoroge KJN The Conditionalities Pre-requisite for Admission into the World Bank/IMF HIPC Initiative: 
Suggestions for a Paradigm Shift (published LLM thesis, Harvard Law School Cambridge Massachusetts, 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
experts to observe at its early stage that many African countries were encountering debt 
servicing obligations beyond their servicing capacity because of a ‘collapse in commodity 
prices, high international rates and protectionism’.90 
 
This debt crisis started in the early 1970s when oil producing countries of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increased the oil price to gain additional revenue.
91
 
Most of these profits were invested with banks in developed countries.
92
 These banks, in turn, 
were keen to lend this money to developing countries so that they could buy products from 
the rich developed countries.
93
 In this manner the loans given to developing countries assisted 
to stimulate production in the North.
94
 At that time, both private and public institutions 
encouraged the South to borrow.
95
 Even the World Bank preached the doctrine of debt as the 
way towards an accelerated development.
96
 As a result, huge amounts were borrowed by the 
political authorities, frequently misused on luxurious projects or embezzled by corrupt 
officials specifically selected by the recent colonial powers to rule these failed African 
states.
97
 Very little was invested productively with a view to achieving sustainable economic 
growth.
98
 As a result, since 1980 the World Bank and the IMF through the Washington 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2002/2003)111, 17. See also Daseking C & Powell R From Toronto Terms to the HIPC Initiative: a Brief 
History of Debt Relief for Low Income Countries (1999) A Working paper of the International Monetary Fund 
WP/99/142, 4. 
90
 Teunissen JJ in Bhattacharya A, Dijkstra G et al HIPC Debt Relief: Myths and Reality (2004) A publication of 
Forum on Debt and Development (FONDAD), 4. 
91
 Daseking C & Powell R From Toronto Terms to the HIPC Initiative: a Brief History of Debt Relief for Low 
Income Countries (1999) A Working paper of the International Monetary Fund WP/99/142, 4. 
92
 Ismi A Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa (2004) A report of Halifax 
Initiative Coalition, 8. 
93
 Husain I & Diwan I Dealing with Debt Crisis: A world Bank Symposium (1989) 15. 
94
 Husain I & Diwan I Dealing with Debt Crisis: A World Bank Symposium (1989 10. 
95
 Daseking C & Powell R From Toronto Terms to the HIPC Initiative: a Brief History of Debt Relief for Low 
Income Countries (1999) A Working paper of the International Monetary Fund WP/99/142, 4. 
96
 Easterly W How did Highly Indebted Poor Countries become Highly Indebted: Reviewing Two decades of 
Debt Relief (1999) Policy Research Working Paper No 2225, 4. 
97
 Easterly W ‘How did Highly Indebted Poor Countries become Highly Indebted: Reviewing Two decades of 
Debt Relief (2002) 30 World Development 1677-1696, 1677. 
98
 Bjerkholt O New Approaches to Debt relief and Debt Sustainability in LDCs (2004) Economic and Social 
Affairs CDP Background Paper No 5, 9. 
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Consensus
99
 have imposed in many developing countries a series of SAPs which were to be 
implemented as a pre-condition for receiving further loans.
100
 In fact the previous SAPs 
required governments to carry out the following far-reaching measures: to cut public 
spending which ended food subsidies, medical care, and education; secondly, to raise interest 
rates in such a way as to reduce access to credit; thirdly, to privatise states enterprises;
101
 
fourthly, to increase exports; and, lastly, to reduce of barriers to trade and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), such as, tariffs and imports duties.
102
 The overall aim of these measures 
was to generate export led growth that would attract FDI and could be used to reduce debt 
and poverty.
103
 
 
In the Cameroon context, the economy dropped in 1986 with the fall in the prices for oil, 
cocoa, coffee, and cotton, combined with the devaluation of the Central African Franc (CFA), 
which led to the erosion of the Cameroon Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by more than 
60%.
104
 As a matter of fact, the government embarked upon a series of economic reforms 
initiated by the World Bank and IMF in the late 1980s.
105
 These measures have been drastic 
given the fact that the government reduced civil service salaries by 65% in 1993. The CFA, 
common currency of Cameroon and 13 other African states, was devalued by 50% in January 
                                                          
99
 The term Washington Consensus was created in 1989 by the economist John Williamson to describe the 
economic reforms package imposed by the IMF and the World Bank to resolve the economic crisis in 
developing countries. 
100
 Ismi A Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa (2004) A report of Halifax 
Initiative Coalition, 8. 
101
 Since 1980, state owned enterprises have been privatised in Cameroon including the telecommunications 
company (CAMTEL), the water company (SNEC), and the Cameroon Airlines Corporation (CAMAIR-Co) .In a 
similar vein, a comprehensive package of measures aimed at improving governance was adopted, such as, the 
National Governance Program (PNG). 
102
 Ismi A Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa (2004) A report of Halifax 
Initiative Coalition, 5. 
103
 Ismi A Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa (2004) A report of Halifax 
Initiative Coalition, 5. 
104
 AFRODAD Mapping Chinese Development Assistance in Cameroon: An Analysis of the Experiences of 
Cameroon (2011) A report of African Forum Network on Debt and Development, 13. 
105
 AFRODAD Mapping Chinese Development Assistance in Cameroon: An Analysis of the Experiences of 
Cameroon (2011) A report of Forum Network on Debt and Development, 13. 
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1994.
106
 Instead of resolving the economic crisis, the devaluation of the CFA rather 
contributed to increase debt stocks and debt burden ratios for the poorest indebted 
countries.
107
 In addition, the economic reforms initiated by the IMF and the World Bank in 
Cameroon did not achieve a sustained growth.
108
 Cameroon’s economic growth increased for 
almost 15 years.
109
 In fact, the growth rate averaged 4% between 1994 and 2003, dropped 
down in 2004 and 2005 (2% in 2005) and increased again in 2006 to just 3.8%.
110
 
Unfortunately, this did not have a positive impact on poverty reduction.
111
 The poverty rate of 
40% in 1994 has remained unchanged till today. In response to this failure, new rescheduling 
terms were negotiated in 1988 at the G7 meeting in Toronto, Canada, 
112
 which resulted in 
that up to one-third of the poorest countries’ debts might be cancelled either by forgiving the 
debt partially or by granting concessional interest rates.
113
 Later on, the Toronto terms were 
amended during the G7 meeting in London, which provided that up to 50 per cent of the Low 
Income Countries’ (LICs) debts may possibly be cancelled.114 Thereafter, in 1994 the Naples 
terms once more reviewed the portion of the relievable debt to be cancelled and offered up to 
67 per cent of debt cancellation to those countries having good economic records.
115
 The 
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Naples terms’ purpose was to cancel the debt burden of the poorest countries in such a way 
that they would be able to pay the remaining debt without further relief.
116
 
 
Following these meetings, in 1996, as ultimate solution, the IMF and the World Bank 
adopted the HIPC Debt Relief Initiative Agreement at the G7 summit in Lyon in 
France.
117According to the HIPC Initiative Agreement :‘[T]he HIPC Initiative was launched 
in 1996 by the IMF and World Bank, with the aim of ensuring that no poor country faces a 
debt burden it cannot manage.’118 Therefore, the HIPC Initiative Agreement was considered 
as a significant ‘building block in the broader development architecture of policies, programs 
and institutional development in support of sustainable growth and poverty reduction.’119 It 
represented an improvement with regards to the traditional debt relief mechanism because it 
acknowledged that the problem of the HIPCs was not illiquidity but insolvency, and needed a 
more comprehensive and radical approach.
120
 For the first time, the HIPC Initiative 
Agreement involves both multilateral and bilateral creditors and consists of several remedies, 
such as, debt relief, debt cancellation and structural and social policy reform specifically 
focused on the provision of health and education.
121
 
 
In 1999, following the G7 summit in Cologne, Germany, the HIPC Initiative Agreement was 
reviewed and strengthened and became known as the 'Enhanced HIPC Debt Relief Initiative' 
Agreement.
122
 The revision of the HIPC Initiative Agreement aimed to provide the following 
three principal innovations: first, a ‘deeper’ and ‘broader relief’, meaning a greater 
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cancellation of debt burden so as to enable many poor countries to qualify and enjoy greater 
debt relief under the HIPC Initiative Agreement; secondly, a ‘faster relief’, implying that all 
the creditors begin to grant interim debt relief immediately at the decision point (this aspect 
will be further explained in this chapter); and thirdly, a ‘stronger link between debt relief and 
poverty reduction’, meaning that resources are freed up to be used to support poverty 
reduction strategies through ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’ which are developed by 
national governments in discussion with civil society.
123
  
 
Originally the HIPC Initiative Agreement was designed for two years, but has now been 
expanded four times: in 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004; the reason was to enable more 
developing countries to qualify under the HIPC Initiative Agreement and enjoy the 
subsequent benefits.
124
 According to the IMF factsheet on the HIPC, in 2005, the HIPC 
Initiative Agreement was complemented by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) ‘in 
order to accelerate progress toward the United Nations Millennium Development Goals’ 
(MDGs).
125
 Furthermore,‘[t]he MDRI allows for 100 percent relief of eligible debts by three 
multilateral institutions the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Fund 
(AfDF)for countries completing the HIPC Initiative process’.126 Moreover, according to the 
IMF factsheet on the HIPC, ‘[i]n 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank (IaDB) also 
decided to provide additional (‘beyond HIPC’) debt relief to the five HIPCs in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
127
 However, what are the main objectives and features of the HIPC Initiative 
Agreement? 
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2.4. Main objectives and key features of the HIPC Initiative Agreement 
 
The HIPC Initiative Agreement is an innovative legal document with specific objectives and 
features. These two aspects will be further discussed in the next sections. 
 
2.4.1 Main objectives of the HIPC Initiative Agreement 
 
According to the HIPC Initiative Agreement, ‘[t]he Joint IMF-World Bank’s comprehensive 
approach to debt reduction is designed to ensure that no poor country faces a debt burden it 
cannot manage.’128 Thus, the aim of the HIPC Initiative Agreement is not to cancel the whole 
debt of poor countries but rather to ensure that ‘no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot 
manage.’129 Its objectives have evolved over the years.130  
 
Originally, according to the HIPC Initiative Agreement, the HIPC Initiative was designed ‘to 
reduce to sustainable levels the external debt burdens of the most heavily indebted poor 
countries’ by ending the vicious cycle of debt rescheduling.131 Thereafter, the HIPC Initiative 
Agreement aimed at raising long-term growth rates by removing the debt surplus.
132
 Later on it 
focuses on poverty reduction by freeing up resources from debt service payments for greater 
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social spending, such as, education, health and other social services. Yet it is very important to 
highlight the key features of the HIPC Initiative Agreement.
133
  
 
2.4.2 Key Features of the HIPC Initiative Agreement 
 
The conception of the HIPC Initiative provides an innovative way to effectively use the 
resources made available from lower debt service payments for poverty reduction expenditure.
134
 
Given the fact that the targeted countries are amongst the poorest in the world, the Initiative has 
taken into account the ability to make a significant input to poverty reduction.
135
 In this 
environment it is noteworthy to point out that recent historical gross resource flows to HIPCs 
were three and half times the level of debt service payments made.
136
 Though the contribution of 
the HIPC Initiative Agreement is essential for these countries’ forthcoming resource needs, much 
more international support is needed to fund their poverty reduction strategies.
137
 The HIPC 
Initiative Agreement represents an important shift with specific eligibility criteria attached. 
 
2.5 Eligibly criteria under the HIPC Initiative Agreement 
 
The HIPC Initiative Agreement is intended to help those countries which cannot reach a 
sustainable debt burden only through traditional mechanisms of rescheduling and debt 
reduction.
138
 These countries ought to carry out IMF and World Bank supported adjustment 
programmes and must implement a poverty reduction strategy so as to ensure that the benefits 
achieved by the special assistance rewarded through the HIPC Initiative are used to advance their 
development.
139
 Subsequent to the effective implementation of its three year economic and 
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financial program from 1997 to 2000, Cameroon benefitted from the enhanced HIPC Initiative to 
reach the decision point in October 2000.
140
 Additional to these eligibility criteria, the HIPC 
Initiative is run in two phases. 
 
2.6 The HIPC Initiative Agreement phases 
 
According to the IMF factsheet on the HIPC, there are two major phases to the HIPC Initiative 
Agreement: the decision point and the completion point.
141
 During the first phase, countries have 
to implement certain specific measures in order to be granted interim debt service relief. 
Thereafter, they should additionally implement certain policies and meet certain requirements in 
order to qualify for full assistance.
142
 
 
2.6.1 The decision point phase 
 
According to the HIPC Initiative Agreement, four conditionalities need to be fulfilled or 
satisfactorily implemented by the debtor countries in order to receive interim debt relief.
143
 These 
conditionalities are as follow: 
 first, the debtor country should ‘be eligible to borrow from the World Bank’s 
International Development Agency, which provides interest-free loans and grants to 
the world’s poorest countries, and from the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Trust, which provides loans to low-income countries at subsidized rates.’ 
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 Secondly, ‘the debtor country should ‘[f]ace an unsustainable debt burden that cannot 
be addressed through traditional debt relief mechanisms.’ 
 Thirdly, the debtor country must ‘have established a track record of reform and sound 
policies through IMF-and World Bank supported programs’.144 
  Fourthly, the debtor country must have ‘developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) through a broad-based participatory process in the country.’ 145 
Once a country has achieved or satisfactorily implemented these four criteria, the Executive 
Boards of the IMF and World Bank officially make a decision concerning its eligibility for debt 
relief, and the international community engages to reduce debt to a level which is deemed to be 
sustainable.
146
 Consequently, Cameroon reached its decision point on 16 October 2000, after 
successful completion of the abovementioned requirements, and the Boards of the IMF and 
World Bank approved US$ 1.260 billion worth of debt relief at end-June 1999 Net Present Value 
(NPV) terms under the enhanced HIPC Framework.
147
 This US$ 1.260 billion worth of debt 
relief assistance amounts to a 26.9 per cent reduction in the country’s outstanding stock of debt 
at end-June 1999 after full use of traditional debt relief mechanisms.
148
 According to the HIPC 
Initiative timeframes, Cameroon was expected to reach its completion point by 2003.
149
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However, the question arises: what were the specific requirements imposed on Cameroon by the 
IMF and the World Bank to meet the completion point phase? 
 
2.6.2 The completion point phase 
 
In the light of the HIPC Initiative Agreement, as is the case with the decision point, specific 
conditionalities must be fulfilled in order to benefit from full and irrevocable assistance under the 
HIPC Initiative.
150
 According to the Cameroon HIPC Approval Document Completion Point 
under the Enhanced Framework, in order to meet its completion point, Cameroon was required to 
implement the following six conditions decided at the decision point: 
 
 ‘Preparation of a full PRSP; 
 Implementation of the I-PRSP for at least one year; 
 Consolidation of macroeconomic reforms, based on progress under an IMF-
supervised Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) program; 
 Satisfactory implementation of policy reforms articulated in the Third Structural 
Adjustment Credit (SAC III); 
 Satisfactory implementation of the priority strategy and action plan for improving 
governance and combating corruption; 
 Ensuring that regulatory agencies for key sectors, including water, electricity, and 
telecommunications) are autonomous and are operating in an efficient and 
professional manner; 
 Satisfactory and timely implementation of sector strategies in education and 
health; 
 Concrete progress in prioritizing the fight against HIV/AIDS.’151 
 
Unfortunately Cameroon did not meet its completion point as planned by 2003 but only three 
years later on 1 May 2006, for two main reasons: the repetitive bad performance observed in the 
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fiscal arena,
152
 and the fact that the government program supported by the PRGF was not 
satisfactorily implemented.
153
 Later on, on 1 May 2006, after Cameroon’s successful 
implementation of its completion point triggers, the IMF and the World Bank decided that 
Cameroon had made satisfactory progress in the implementation of the abovementioned 
requirements, and subsequently proclaimed it as the 19th country to reach the completion point 
under the HIPC Initiative.
154
 Following Cameroon’s completion point achievement, the IMF 
granted 100 per cent debt relief on all debt incurred by Cameroon to the IMF before 1 January 
2005, which was not yet repaid.
155
 Additionally, Cameroon also qualified for supplementary debt 
relief from the International Development Assistance (IDA), the IMF and the AfDF under the 
MDRI.
156
 Although the HIPC Initiative’ objectives have expanded and generated high 
expectations among stakeholders and development partners, the HIPC Initiative has remained a 
limited instrument.  
 
2.7 Critical legal analysis of HIPC Initiative Agreement in line with states international 
obligations 
  
This section critically assess the implementation of the HIPC Initiative Agreement against its 
background and with regard to states’ obligations pertaining to international co-operation and 
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human rights as enshrined in international legal instruments. Thus, the HIPC Initiative 
Agreement has been subject to certain criticisms from a number of experts and organisations 
across the globe even before its implementation by poor countries, including Cameroon. The 
reason for this is that, like its predecessors, the SAPs, the HIPC Initiative retained some of the 
components of their weakened results.
157
 (This argument will be further illustrated under section 
2.7.1). Consequently, the forecast of the HIPC Initiative Agreement’s mitigated outcomes was 
not a surprise at all.
158
 The next subsection examines the conditionalities as one of the most 
grievous criticisms encountered by the HIPC Initiative Agreement. 
 
2.7.1 Conditionalities 
 
The first criticism targets the conditionalities requirement. The HIPC Initiative Agreement was 
criticised on the ground that it did not bring much relief in reality because the current 
conditionalities attached are also the same as those which engendered the problems of poorest 
countries in the first place.
159
 Like the SAPs, the HIPC Initiative Agreement is based upon the 
neoliberal agenda characterised by the following four targets: liberalisation; privatisation of 
public services and companies; deregulations of labour relations and cutting social safety nets; 
and improvement of competitiveness. As regards the recipient country, these measures imply the 
reduction of the government deficit through cuts in public spending (cost recovery programmes); 
higher interest rates; liberalisation of foreign exchange rules and trade (deregulation); 
rationalisation and privatisation of public and parastatal companies; and deregulation of the 
economy.
160
 This means that the HIPC Initiative Agreement conditionalities are major obstacles 
to the attainment of sustainability and growth by the HIPCs. In January 1998, even Stiglitz 
described the structural adjustment policy of the HIPC Initiative Agreement as ‘misguided’, and 
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called for a more humble approach to macro-economics and an undertaking to maintain promises 
made in the social sectors.
161
 Following this same argument Gunter mentioned that both the 
original HIPC Agreement framework and the Enhanced HIPC Agreement Framework were 
inappropriate to provide debt sustainability and that adequate revision and adjustments need to 
be made in order to enable the HIPC Initiative Agreement to achieve effectively its goals of 
poverty reduction and debt sustainability.
162
 
 
Furthermore, the imposition of political conditionalities are contrary both to the United Nations 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of 
States and the Resolution on the Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-
Interference in the Internal Affairs of States in their Electoral Processes.
163
 According to Article 
1 of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs 
of States ‘[n]o State or group of States has the right to intervene or interfere in any form or for 
any reason whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of other States’.164 Furthermore, in 
light of the Declaration on the Right to Development the conditionalities requirement is contrary 
to Article 3(3) which provides that ‘States should realize their rights and fulfil their duties in 
such a manner as to promote a new international economic order based on sovereign 
equality…’.165Thus, by imposing conditionalities upon HIPCs countries as a prerequisite for 
development assistance the HIPC Initiative Agreement has contravened states’ international 
obligations to work toward the realisation of ‘a new international economic order based on 
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sovereign equality’.166 In the same vein, Oxfam (2006) added that the conditionalities are 
contrary to democracy throughout the world since they are perceived as a political instrument by 
which the World Bank and the IMF imposed their will upon poor countries by reshaping their 
economies according to their norms and values without consulting the concerned countries.
167
 As 
a result, they end up undermining national policy making, delay aid flows, and sometimes fail to 
deliver for poor people.
168
 For all these reasons the abundant literature relating to the IMF and 
the World Bank describes these international financial institutions as ‘secretive’, ‘unaccountable’ 
and ‘ineffective’.169 According to Danaher, in the early l990s, while the IMF and the World Bank 
claimed to facilitate the development of third world countries, and to get them out of debt, most 
of their clients have not only remained underdeveloped and poor but have fallen deeper into 
debt.
170
 He further observed that by the mid-l990s, the global gap between the rich and poor 
countries had roughly doubled since 1960.
171
 Today the top 20 per cent of the world's population 
controls more than 80 per cent of the world's wealth and the bottom 20 per cent controls about 1 
per cent.
172
 Debt payments from the poor countries to the rich usually amount to far more than 
new aid or foreign investment flowing from the rich to the poor countries.
173
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Responding to the above-mentioned criticisms, the IMF stated:  
 
‘Even if the international community were prepared to cancel all HIPC debt, it needs to be 
understood that the HIPC Initiative is not a panacea, and debt is only one of many problems these 
countries face…Unconditional debt relief is not the right tool for promoting the ultimate goals of 
sustainable development and poverty reduction. These goals are best attained by providing debt 
relief in a process, such as under the HIPC Initiative, which encourages the adoption of 
appropriate policies by the recipient country designed to stimulate private sector-led growth and 
focuses on an improvement in social indicators…unconditional debt cancellation risks debt relief 
being squandered on corruption, military expenditure, or grandiose projects with little if any 
benefit in terms of sustainable growth or poverty reduction.’174  
 
As a result, it appears that conditionalities are not always negative. Although the IMF 
conditionalities are contrary to the sacrosanct principle of state sovereignty and non-interference 
in a state’s international affairs, as indicated above, it is submitted that the IMF conditionalities 
could be an appropriate tool for promoting sustainable development and reduce poverty since the 
IMF clearly stated that it encourages the adoption of appropriate macro-economic policies by the 
recipient countries which are well-known as being mostly corrupt and badly governed. 
 
2.7.2 Insufficient additional financing for social spending 
 
According to the HIPC Initiative Agreement, it was meant to provide a ‘faster, deeper, and 
broader debt relief’ but on the ground the resources released appear limited.175 According to 
Gautam the current requirement to spend all savings from debt servicing solely on social 
expenditures is seen by most debtor countries as highly inflexible.
176
 Their programs have been 
heavily criticised for many years for resulting in poverty.
177
 Moreover, Schabbel emphasised that 
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despite the claims of the IMF and the World Bank regarding poverty reduction, there has been an 
increased dependency of developing countries on the richer nations.
178
 The previous SAPs
179
 
have been imposed to ensure debt repayment and economic restructuring.
180
 But, Schabbel 
declared that the way it has happened has required poor countries to reduce spending on things 
like health, education and development, while debt repayment and other economic policies have 
been made the priority.
181
 In effect, the IMF and World Bank have demanded that poor nations 
lower the standard of living of their people.
182
 
 
Teunissen criticised the HIPC Initiative Agreement for providing unrealistic growth assumptions 
and projections for HIPCs.
183
 The projections linked to growth in revenues had been 
overestimated, and the debt servicing is more likely to absorb larger shares of government 
revenue than the World Bank projections stated.
184
 Thus, Gunter argued that in many instances, 
even after receiving debt relief, HIPCs are still going to spend larger sums of money on debt 
payments than on social services.
185
 
 
In addition, the European Network on Debt and Development, for instance, strongly pointed out 
that the HIPC Initiative is not likely to free up resources to embark upon poverty reduction.
186
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Furthermore, Bhattacharya and Dijkstra argued that because the resources generated by the HIPC 
Initiative Agreement remained low, many HIPCs did not embody the attainment of the MDGs in 
their PRSPs.
187
 For this reason, Bhattacharya (of the World Bank) concluded that the MDGs can 
only be met if the rich countries give more aid.
188
 Furthermore, Cammack emphasised that the 
only way for the IMF and the World Bank to achieve effective poverty reduction is to include the 
poor in their poverty reduction programs.
189
 
 
Regarding the criticism that the HIPC Initiative freed up insufficient resources for social 
spending, the IMF provided the following argument:  
 
‘It is simplistic and misleading to compare scheduled debt service in HIPCs with neither their 
level of social spending, as this recognizes the debt relief provided to these countries nor the 
offsetting inflows of foreign aid. A closer look at a sample of 27 HIPCs, for which recent data are 
available, shows that, on average, actual debt service paid even prior to HIPC assistance is 
considerably below scheduled debt service; for most HIPCs, debt-service payments are actually 
lower than government budgetary expenditures on health and education.’190 
 
Therefore, it is submitted that this point of view held by the IMF could be a valid one since it is a 
multilateral financial institution of a great authority in terms of the qualified experts it is working 
with and the quality of reports it frequently releases to inform the public. 
 
2.7.3 The eligibility criteria 
 
According to the European Network on Debt and Development ‘threshold levels to measure debt 
sustainability are arbitrary and still too high’.191 Moreover the word ‘sustainability’ was defined 
in terms of human and social development instead of economic terms resulting in many Least 
Developed Countries with heavy debt burdens being excluded from the HIPC Initiative.
192
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On this criticism the argument of the IMF is: 
 
‘The eligibility criteria under the HIPC Initiative reflect a broad-based consensus of member 
governments that the poorest countries should have the highest priority in concessional debt 
relief. The IDA-only and ESAF-eligibility requirements ensure this by linking eligibility for 
HIPC assistance to the poverty status of a country.’193 
 
This study also supports the view held by the IMF because with regard to the list of 39 eligible 
HIPCs
194
, it can be said that the HIPC Initiative framework has included all the poorest countries 
of the world. 
 
2.7.4 The HIPC Initiative Agreement failed to achieve its objectives of growth and long-
term debt sustainability 
 
The HIPC Initiative Agreement was designed to achieve growth and long-term sustainability.
195
 
However, Kwadwo stated that the HIPC Initiative framework was ineffective in providing 
poverty reduction and long-term debt sustainability to African countries.
196
 He further mentioned 
that the HIPC Initiative Agreement is far from being an instrument of poverty reduction or 
human development enhancement but rather ‘an instrument of power and control of the North 
over Africa and the rest of the South’.197 As a result, people have become disappointed with the 
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Initiative on the basis that it has been protecting creditors’ interests rather than those of 
debtors.
198
  
 
On the one hand, responding to the criticism that the HIPC Initiative framework has been 
ineffective in properly addressing poverty reduction, the IMF pointed out: 
 
‘The HIPC Initiative has always emphasized the need to link debt reduction with effective long-
term policies for economic and social development, including poverty alleviation. For this reason, 
social development criteria are developed jointly with country authorities and explicitly 
incorporated into HIPC conditionality. However, poverty reduction is not a simple task, and 
governments’ abilities to absorb the financial resources provided to them are often a constraint 
when they seek to implement social programs expeditiously and efficiently. Moreover, when 
considering the resources available for social development, it should be recognized that most 
HIPCs are already receiving large positive net transfers from creditors and donors that enable 
them to pursue their development agenda. Debt relief should not be seen as a substitute for 
continued inflows of development finance.’199 
 
On the other hand, with regard to the criticism that the HIPC Initiative Agreement did not 
provide debt sustainability, the IMF declared, amongst others:  
 
‘The Initiative has always focused on the achievement of external debt sustainability. Certain 
categories of debt are omitted from its definition of external debt sustainability for practical 
reasons (debt owed by private citizens, for example, cannot be practically subsumed under 
rescheduling agreements. Nevertheless, high levels of external private debt or a large domestic 
debt-service burden for the government are potential vulnerability factors that play a role in 
setting the country-specific debt sustainability targets.’200 
 
It is submitted that growth and long term debt sustainability are complex issues which can not be 
achieved by external donors’ policies or the HIPC Initiative alone but also and mostly required 
                                                          
198
 Gautam M Debt Relief for the Poorest: An OED review of the HIPC Initiative (2003) 25. See also Isar S ‘Was the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) a Success?’ (2012) 9 Consilience: the Journal of Sustainable 
Development 107-122, 115. 
199
 ‘HIPC Initiative: The IMF’s Response to Critics’ A publication of the IMF available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/res.htm (accessed 26 march 2014). 
200
 ‘HIPC Initiative: The IMF’s Response to Critics’ A publication of the IMF available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/res.htm (accessed 26 march 2014). 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
the active contribution of recipient countries through the adoption of ‘effective long-term 
policies for economic and social development, including poverty alleviation.’201 
 
2.7.5 The HIPC Initiative Agreement did not protect against exogenous shocks 
 
The HIPC Initiative is reproached for having done too little ‘to protect countries against 
exogenous shocks such as volatility in commodity prices and thus failed to address the impact of 
these shocks on debt sustainability’.202 Isar pointed out that throughout history, the world has 
observed a number of economic crises provoked by exogenous factors which severely impacted 
on several poor countries’ economies beyond their control.203 According to Martin exogenous 
shocks refer to ‘unexpected factors beyond the control of the government which undermine 
economic prospects’.204 Berensmann believes that the most common of these factors in LICs are 
‘commodity price shocks, natural disasters and exchange-rate shocks.’205 
 
Furthermore, Isar mentioned that ‘the global fall of prices of commodities has harmfully affected 
the debt sustainability measurement in Africa, particularly in Uganda, despite being the first and 
the best performer of the HIPC.’206 According to Isar the IMF itself admitted the failure of the 
HIPC Initiative Agreement to protect many poor African countries against exogenous shocks and 
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more particularly exports volatility.
207
 For instance, about 60 per cent of the cocoa in the world 
which is produced by the following 3 African HIPCs Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana are 
constantly fluctuating.
208
 Hussain pointed out that the prices of these commodities are 
particularly volatile.
209
 For instance, between 1983 and 1997, cocoa prices fluctuated between 60 
per cent and 170 per cent of the average price over this period, and robusta coffee from 40 per 
cent to 195.
210
 
 
Responding on the criticism that the HIPC Initiative Agreement failed to protect against 
exogenous shocks, the IMF argues: 
‘The HIPC Initiative has tried to balance the various theoretical considerations in a workable 
approach that centers on exports as a reliable and comparable measure across countries, but 
focuses on fiscal revenues in highly open economies where the use of exports may exaggerate the 
country’s payment capacity.To address moral hazard, this fiscal/openness criterion is only applied 
in countries with sufficiently strong revenue performance (i.e., a revenue-to-GDP ratio of at least 
20 percent).’211 
 
Exogenous shocks are very difficult to prevent given that the market is always unpredictable and 
inflexible. Therefore, if the IMF failed to protect HIPCs against exogenous shocks, it is 
important to recognise that it has made all the efforts to address the situation. In spite of some of 
the criticisms faced by the HIPC Initiative in Cameroon and in Africa, what are its main 
achievements and what are its remaining challenges? 
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2.8 The HIPC Initiative’s achievements in Cameroon and the remaining challenges 
 
The HIPC Initiative Agreement has brought mitigated results to HIPCs in general.
212
 It has 
considerably alleviated debt burdens in recipient countries generally and in Cameroon in 
particular.
213
 Although debt has been considerably decreased after the Enhanced HIPC Initiative 
Agreement, debt sustainability has not been reached for the long term.
214
 According to 
Dhaneshwar, although Cameroon has made remarkable progress in the maintenance of 
macroeconomic stability, the main challenge remains to enhance investment and economic 
growth rates so as to considerably reduce poverty.
215
  
 
In addition, post-completion point HIPCs have made unbalanced progress towards meeting their 
MDGs.
216
 Regardless of some improvements in primary education and ensuring gender equality, 
more than half of HIPCs that have achieved their post-completion point are unlikely to meet their 
MDGs.
217
 Progress has been least in fragile states, which present hard political and governance 
challenges for effective delivery of development finance and services.
218
 On the other hand, 
some positive results have been achieved regarding good governance, the fight against 
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corruption, budgetary savings from debt relief, and in the education, health and HIV/AIDS 
sectors.
219
 
 
2.9 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The extreme debt burden faced by HIPCs provoked debt unsustainability, increased poverty 
levels and greatly impeded their economic growth. In response to these imbalances, the 
international community and the international financial community embark upon a range of 
solutions which resulted in the HIPC Initiative. Although the HIPC Initiative scheme seems to 
provide much needed assistance from high debt servicing, debt relief is neither a magic potion 
for all economic development problems, nor is a one-time debt reduction an assurance that 
upcoming debt will stay at sustainable levels. 
220
 Consequently, the HIPC Initiative is an 
essential but slight part of the whole development assistance framework. Maybe the utmost 
challenge facing the HIPC Initiative is the expectations of what it is likely to accomplish within 
financing limitations and policy and institutional limitations in the HIPCs.
221
 
 
Reaching the HIPC Initiative three-fold objectives requires undertakings by HIPCs governments 
to adopt rigorous policy frameworks and a well-adjusted development strategy.
222
 In addition, it 
requires actions by the international community to help countries to increase their exports and to 
support required capacity building efforts.
223
 Moreover, donors encountered an additional 
challenge:  to make appropriate resources available for funding the development priorities of 
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HIPCs and other poor countries, and ensure that HIPC debt relief is really additional to other aid 
flows.
224
 Additionally with regard to Cameroon’s economic profile225 characterised by high 
levels of corruption, maladministration, bad governance, and embezzlement, it is urgently 
recommended that the IMF and the World Bank rigorously evaluate and monitor the outcomes of 
the HIPC Initiative in each specific HIPC in order to make both debtor and creditor countries 
accountable. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CHINA’S WHITE PAPER ON FOREIGN AID 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The rise of China is one of the most outstanding features observed in the international arena in 
recent decades.
226
 In 2005, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) reported that China’s growth rate had increased by approximately 10% per annum over 
the past decades and that it was projected to become the world’s fourth economy in the next five 
years.
227
 Today China has significantly challenged that projection and is ranked as the second 
largest economic power in the world after the United States of America (USA) and it is expected 
to become the most powerful economic power in the world by 2016.
228
 Stone added that ‘China 
has become the largest new investor, trader, buyer, and aid donor in a raft of African countries, 
and a major new economic force in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.’229 Thus China’s deepening 
integration into the global economy and emergence as an economic power have spread its 
vision
230
 into Africa, reshaping political and economic relationships in such a way as to secure its 
access to the African market and raw materials.
231
 In fact, China is rapidly expanding its 
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engagement in Africa in the fields of development cooperation, trade and investment in 
accordance with the Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid.
232
 
 
According to Ayenagbo, China is now performing a double function as the exclusive balancing 
power to the USA and as the ‘torchbearer’ for the Developing World.233 In light of this growing 
international influence, and the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) China has redefined its geo-strategic vision, calling for multi-polarity and a new 
economic and political international order, and has re-engaged African countries under a new 
partnership framework.
234
 Thus, under the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China Africa 
Cooperation (2004), China has criticised the current international economic order and proposed 
a new international framework for a more just and fair international system in the following 
terms : 
‘We reaffirm that the injustice and inequality in the current international system are incompatible 
with the trend of the times towards world peace and development, hinder the development of the 
countries of the South and pose threats to international peace and security. We stress that the 
establishment of a just and equitable new international political and economic order is 
indispensable for the democratisation of international relations and for the effective participation 
of developing countries in the international process of decision-making.’235 
 
During the 1990s, China originally developed its relations with African countries individually in 
the political, economic, trade and military arenas and later expanded them to cooperation and 
multilateral issues.
236
  
 
Traditionally, China’s assistance has provided support for poverty reduction, has focused on 
sectors which have been relatively neglected and untouched by Africa’s traditional development 
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partners
237
, and does not impact on debt sustainability.
238
 This is, for instance, the case with 
regard to infrastructure, construction, supplying materials and commodities, and dispatching 
experts or free aid, interest-free loans, subsidised loans, technological assistance and training, 
expert advisors, personnel and technical training.
239
  
 
However, China’s development assistance has been at the centre of certain concerns such as 
China’s development assistance is targeting primarily rich mineral and oil-producing countries, 
and for providing aid to recipient countries regardless of the quality of governance.
240
 But these 
western criticisms of China’s development assistance to Africa did not get much reaction and 
support in Africa.
241
 Notwithstanding the controversy about China’s development assistance 
approach, it is regarded nowadays by many African countries as the ‘new African choice’.242 
 
The present chapter first presents a historical overview of the China-Cameroon relationship. 
Secondly, it examines the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC and the Chinese White Paper on 
Foreign Aid. Thirdly, it presents the role of the Chinese government with regard to development 
assistance. Furthermore, it emphasises the scope of, and undertakes a critical legal analysis of, 
China’s development assistance in Cameroon in light of the White Paper on Foreign Aid, the 
Beijing Declaration on FOCAC and with regard to states’ international obligations as enshrined 
in international legal instruments. Finally, the last section assesses the positive and negative 
impacts of China’s development assistance approach in Cameroon. 
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3.2. Historical overview of the China-Cameroon relationship 
 
This section basically examines the evolution of the China-Cameroon relationship from 
Cameroon’s independence in 1960 till today. It includes the beginning of China-Cameroon 
cooperation and some of the multilateral and bilateral agreements
243
 they have both concluded. 
Given the fact that these agreements are largely inaccessible and unpublished, the current section 
will be restricted to describing only some of them. 
 
Cameroon established diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China after ending its 
cooperation with Taiwan on 26 March 1971.
244
 According to the ‘one-China principle’, states 
willing to establish diplomatic relations with China must cease any political alliance with 
Taiwan.
245
 
 
Moreover, Sino-Cameroon relations are particularly strong because Cameroon is one of the 
African countries which enabled Mainland China to obtain the United Nations Security Council 
seat from Taiwan.
246
 Since then, Sino-Cameroon relations have progressively developed with 
friendly economic and social cooperation.
247
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After the independence of Cameroon and its reunification respectively in 1960 and 1961, 
Cameroon shifted from its previous non-aligned position
248
 and decided to establish relationships 
with both capitalist and communist governments because all forms of colonialism and 
imperialism were officially and worldwide abolished.
249
 In addition, it was time for Cameroon 
and all the former African colonies to build up their economies.
250
 Grasping both development 
opportunities offered was actually the wisest choice Cameroon could have ever made, noting 
that, although specific and different both approaches complement each other.
251
 
 
Officially, Cameroon and China have both entered into various multilateral agreements relative 
to economic and technical cooperation.
252
 These agreements mostly define the modalities of 
China’s concessional lending, but others pertain to cultural, technical and also diplomatic 
relations.
253
 As previously indicated in Chapter I, the key agreements include:  
 a general trade agreement in 1972 254; 
 an agreement for the reciprocal protection and promotion of investments in 1997 255; and 
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 an agreement for economic and commercial cooperation in 2002.256 
 
In addition, according to AFRODAD, Cameroon and China have also concluded several bilateral 
agreements in 2010, including: an agreement for a grant and an interest free loan for open 
technical cooperation projects to be specified by Cameroon; a convention for the equipment of 
the Cameroon Road Construction Equipment Pool (MATGENIE) with a preferential rate loan; a 
memorandum of understanding on global cooperation and the financing of future projects when 
they are designed; a framework convention to back an initiative for investment in unspecified 
areas of the agricultural sector; and a draft agreement for the provision of training by China in 
the area of new technology for the running of Cameroon’s postal network.257 
 
These accords have permitted Chinese enterprises to actively participate in Cameroon’s socio-
economic development, such as, road construction and other infrastructures.
258
 Furthermore, 
China assisted Cameroon with roughly US$100 million of economic development assistance in 
the two decades prior to 2005 and the bilateral trade volume that year exceeded US$190 
million.
259
 The end of diplomatic relations between Cameroon and Taiwan has reinforced the 
collaboration between China and Cameroon.
260
 In fact, China is expecting diplomatic support 
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from Cameroon and the rest of Africa’s countries as well at the international level, particularly 
with reference to activities associated with the United Nations (UN) and other international 
institutions, in terms of votes on global issues. 
261
 For instance, the activism of the ‘Group of 77 
(G77) and China’ in the UN processes is a good illustration. In fact, African countries’ support 
was critical throughout the 15 years it took for China to be officially granted membership of the 
World Trade Organisation, in November 2001.
262
 After this overview of the historical relation 
between China and Cameroon, the next section examines the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC 
and China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid. 
 
 3.3 An overview of the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and 
China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid 
 
The current section examines only some of the provisions of the Beijing Declaration of the 
FOCAC and China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid which are directly in connection to the 
research topic. The Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC and China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid 
are of paramount importance for the purpose of this research because they constitute the legal 
framework upon which this study will principally focus to analyse and assess China’s 
development assistance in Africa generally and in Cameroon in particular. (These legal 
documents will be further illustrated in Chapter 4). 
 
According to the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC, FOCAC is a legal ‘…framework for 
collective dialogue between China and African countries on the basis of equality and mutual 
benefit’ whose common objective lies in seeking peace and development.263 The FOCAC 
Declaration of the FOCAC emphases that the FOCAC dialogue platform was initiated following 
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numerous imbalances that China and African countries have observed in the current international 
system, such as: 
 the ‘…huge gap between the rich North and the poor South and that peace and 
development are far from being fully realised…;  
 injustice and inequality in the current international system are incompatible with the trend 
of the times towards world peace and development, hinder the development of the 
countries of the South and pose threats to international peace and security…;  
 globalisation makes all economies more inter-dependent, but it benefits developed 
countries more while putting most developing countries, especially small and vulnerable 
economies and the least developed countries in Africa, at a disadvantage and subjecting 
their economic security or even state sovereignty to severe challenges…;   
 African countries and the African continent as a whole are still faced with many 
difficulties and challenges in their process of development…;  
 the heavy debt burden has impeded the development efforts of African countries and 
impoverished their economies.’ 264 
 
According to Article 1 of the Beijing Declaration of FOCAC, China respects the principles of the 
United Nations Charter and other international law instruments in the following terms  
 
‘The purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the Charter of the Organisation of African 
Unity(OAU), the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and other universally recognised 
principles governing relations among states must be respected. All countries should have the right 
to participate in international affairs, on an equal footing. No country or group of countries has 
the right to impose its will on others, to interfere, under whatever pretext, in other countries' 
internal affairs, or to impose unilateral coercive economic measures on others. The North and the 
South should strengthen their dialogue and co-operation on the basis of equality.’265 
 
In addition, according to Article 4 of the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC China advocates 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the following terms  
 
‘The universality of human rights and fundamental freedoms should be respected and the 
diversity of the world and the principle of seeking common ground while reserving differences 
                                                          
264
 Preamble of the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC (2004). 
265
 Article 1 of the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC (2004). 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
must be upheld and carried forward. Each country has the right to choose, in its course of 
development, its own social system, development model and way of life in light of its national 
conditions. Countries, that vary from one another in social system, stages of development, 
historical and cultural background and values, have the right to choose their own approaches and 
models in promoting and protecting human rights in their own countries. Moreover, the 
politicisation of human rights and the imposition of human rights conditionalities on economic 
assistance should be vigorously opposed to as they constitute a violation of human rights.’ 
 
Furthermore Article 5 of the Declaration of the FOCAC recognises that: 
 
‘The principle of conducting mutually beneficial co-operation and seeking common development 
should be advocated. Developed countries have the responsibility and obligation to provide 
financial, technological and other assistance to developing countries, African countries in 
particular. They should work out feasible development programs for and co-operate with them on 
the basis of equality and mutual benefit with a view to achieving common development for both 
the North and the South. The developing countries, on their part, should unite and co-ordinate 
with each other more closely, maximising advantages while minimising disadvantages and 
adversities, as well as tackle together challenges brought about by globalisation.’ 
 
 
According to African Forum on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), the historical co-operation 
between China and Cameroon fits into the new trend adopted by China in its relations with 
Africa subsequent to the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC in 2006.
266
 This new strategic 
partnership, also known as the Beijing Consensus, is claiming values such as ‘political equality, 
mutual trust, economic win-win co-operation and cultural exchanges’.267 This means that the 
ultimate objective of China’s engagement with African countries is to serve mutual interests and 
mutual gains as well. Accordingly, during that Summit, an ‘action plan’268 was agreed upon 
between China and African countries, including Cameroon, to serve as a guideline for bilateral 
cooperation throughout the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 in the political, economic and social 
sectors. 
269
 The action plan also included development and economic assistance, debt reduction, 
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training of professionals, culture, education, public health, environmental protection, and tourism 
(these aspects will be further discussed later in this chapter). 
 
Moreover, Cameroon was granted Approved Destination Status (ADS) for Chinese tourism in 
November 2006 after the FOCAC Summit in Beijing.
270
 This actually means that the government 
of China will financially assist Chinese companies willing to engage in the tourism business in 
Cameroon, through Exim Bank of China. 
271
 After all, the economic relations between the two 
nations would be an investment increasing factor in an area in which the Cameroon government 
is willing to gather more investment resources, as part of its new strategy for employment and 
growth.
272
.  
 
As far as the White Paper is concerned, according to the OECD, up until recently China’s 
development assistance has been a ‘sensitive’ matter and was even considered a ‘state secret’.273 
In April 2011, due to the amount of concerns raised in this regard, China officially published a 
White Paper on Foreign Aid which gives clear indications of the country’s development 
assistance efforts and policies over the past years.
274
 The Chinese Paper on Foreign Aid is a legal 
text of 12 pages and is structured into 8 sections which are as follow: a preface, foreign aid 
policy, and financial resources for foreign aid, the forms of foreign aid, distribution of foreign 
aid, management of foreign aid, international co-operation in foreign aid, a conclusion and 6 
appendixes. (All these aspects will be further discussed in the present chapter.) The preface of 
the Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid highlights that although 
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‘…China remains a developing country with a low per-capita income and a large poverty-stricken 
population. In spite of this, China has been doing its best to provide foreign aid, to help recipient 
countries to strengthen their self-development capacity, enrich and improve their peoples' 
livelihood, and promote their economic growth and social progress.’275 
 
It further emphasises that by ‘[a]dhering to equality and mutual benefit, stressing substantial 
results, and keeping pace with the times without imposing any political conditions on recipient 
countries, China's foreign aid has emerged as a model with its own characteristics.’276 In fact, the 
White Paper on Foreign Aid actually represents the cornerstone of China’s legislation on 
economic related matters; it covers foreign affairs, economic co-operation, trade and investment, 
and is complemented and updated through the White Paper on China-Africa Economic and 
Trade Cooperation
277
 and FOCAC Summits, the last of which was held in July 2012 in 
Beijing.
278
 After this brief introduction to the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC Cooperation 
and China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid, the role of the Chinese government regarding foreign 
aid policy will be examined next. 
 
3.4 The role of the Chinese government 
 
According to Davies, four main actors actively participate in China’s development assistance in 
Africa namely: 
 the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM); 
 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA);  
 the China Export Import Bank (EXIM Bank); and 
  the China Development Bank (CBD).279 
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According to the Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid, the MOFCOM ‘…is the administrative 
department authorised by the State Council to oversee foreign aid. It is responsible for the 
formulation of foreign aid policies, regulations, overall and annual plans, examination and 
approval of foreign aid projects and management of the project execution.’280 Inside the 
MOFCOM, development assistance is the responsibility of two divisions, specifically the 
Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, and the Bureau of International Economic 
Cooperation.
281
 The Department’s functions consist of making annual plans and budgets for 
development assistance disbursements, and drafting regulations which (as in other ministries) 
progressively replace the previous system of state planning.
282
 The Bureau controls the 
implementation phase including bidding, procurement, monitoring, evaluation of aid and 
economic cooperation projects.
283
 
 
However, the MOFA supervises development assistance decisions as they are linked to the 
overall foreign policy objectives. It is responsible for monitoring the general policy trends on 
economic cooperation and development assistance.
284
 
 
The China EXIM Bank founded in 1994, performs three main functions: it is the official export 
agency looking after trade and investment guarantees, it provides aid administration in 
connection with projects evaluation, and it acts as the policy bank that deals with foreign aid that 
comes to China. 
285
 Moreover, the Bank has provided loans to more than 40 states, principally in 
Africa and Asia, all of which have offered a state guarantee for the loans. 
286
 According to 
Davies, the major African countries which have been recipients of China EXIM Bank’s 
concessional financing are: Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Congo Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
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Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe; all countries having questionable governance regimes and some 
of which might not be eligible for funding from traditional donors.
287
 
 
Lastly, the CDB, like the EXIM Bank, was instituted to implement China’s government 
policies.
288
 Its core mission is to grant non-concessional loans to Africa.
289
 After having looked 
at the role of the Chinese government, the next section examines the scope of China’s 
development assistance in Cameroon. 
 
3.5 Scope of China’s development assistance in Cameroon 
 
This section addresses five focal points of China’s development assistance approach in terms of 
the Beijing Declaration of FOCAC, China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid and the White Paper on 
China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation in Cameroon, namely, its objectives, features, 
conditionalities, modalities, areas and framework. Each of these aspects will be elaborated upon 
below. 
 
3.5.1 Objectives of China’s development assistance in Cameroon 
 
According to China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid and with respect to the Beijing Declaration of 
the FOCAC and China’s White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation290, the 
core objectives of China’s development assistance in Africa are to consolidate ‘…friendly 
relations and economic and trade cooperation with other developing countries, promote South-
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South cooperation and contribute to the common development of mankind.’291 The OECD 
believe that by promoting South-South co-operation, China wishes to promote its own specific 
image in the developing world, based upon the spirit of equality and mutual benefit, and as more 
of a partnership than assistance.
292
 After presenting the objectives of China’s development 
assistance, the next section examines the features of China’s development assistance approach. 
 
3.5.2 Features of China’s development assistance approach: a legal analysis 
 
According to the Beijing Declaration on the FOCAC and China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid, 
China’s development assistance approach in Africa generally and in Cameroon in particular, 
rests on the five principles of peaceful co-existence formulated for the first time on 29 April 
1954 when the People’s Republic of China and India signed an Agreement on Trade and 
Communications between the Tibet region of China and India.
293
 Since then, these principles 
constitute China’s roadmap in its international relations.294 In terms of the Chinese Paper on 
Foreign Aid, these principles are the following: mutual respect for each other’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs; equality; and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.
295
 According to Boutros-
Ghali, the main idea behind these principles is that if they were bilaterally and multilaterally 
observed they would become a solid foundation for peace and security in the world.
296
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Thus, commenting on China’s five principles, Kjøllesdal and many other authors pointed out that 
China’s development assistance has challenged that of the OECD donors at four levels.297 First, 
China’s development assistance is based upon equal partnership.298 In addition, China’s White 
Paper on Foreign Aid emphasises that because China is faithful to the principles of ‘equal 
partnership, respect of state sovereignty, and non-interference in states internal affairs’ enshrined 
in the United Nations Charter
299
 and the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC according to which 
‘China never uses foreign aid as a means to interfere in recipient countries' internal affairs or 
seek political privileges for itself.’300 Thus, China respects Cameroon’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and does its best not to interfere in Cameroon’s internal affairs.301 China 
firmly upholds this principle because it believes that sovereignty is the birth right of any self-
governing state, the unification of its national interests and the paramount protection of 
everything it dearly cherishes.
302
 Therefore, according to the Beijing Declaration on the FOCAC 
‘[n]o country or group of countries, has the right to impose its will on others, to interfere, under 
whatever pretext, in other countries' internal affairs, or to impose unilateral coercive economic 
measures on others’.303 Similarly, the Chinese government strictly emphasises the fact that the 
growing interaction and interdependence among states, due to economic globalisation and 
technological revolution, do not suggest that the status and role of sovereignty might in any way 
be ignored or have declined.
304
 Thus, maintaining greater democracy in international relations is 
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very critical. Hence the internal affairs of a country must be decided by its own people, and the 
international issues have to be discussed by all countries on an equal basis.
305
  
 
Secondly, the modes of provision are challenged by China’s focus on aid that is ‘mutually 
beneficial.’306 Also known as China’s win -win policy, the policy of mutual benefit is based on 
eight major principles called the ‘eight principles for economic aid and technical cooperation to 
other countries’307 (these principles will be further elaborated in chapter 4). According to China’s 
win-win policy, whenever China is establishing cooperation agreements with a country, their 
mutual interests have to be clearly defined in advance.
308
 
 
Thirdly, in terms of China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid, China’s development assistance to 
Africa generally and Cameroon specifically is free of political conditions, in contrast to that of 
the Western countries, which tie aid to good governance, democracy or ‘a package of economic 
reforms’.309 Besides, China ‘…respects recipient countries' right to independently select their 
own path and model of development, and believes that every country should explore a 
development path suitable to its actual conditions.’ 310 
 
Lastly, multilateralism is challenged by China’s preference of embarking on the major foreign 
aid projects alone. As a result, China has fulfilled its promises more simply, more quickly and 
more effectively in comparison to the IMF and the World Bank which are multilateral 
institutions.
311
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It is important to emphasise at this stage that the features of China’s development assistance are 
aligned with the public international law principle which imposes on states the respect of state 
sovereignty.
312
 Moreover, they are in conformity with Article 3(3) of the Declaration on the 
Right to Development which stipulates:  
‘States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating 
obstacles to development.  States should realize their rights and fulfil their duties in such a 
manner as to promote a new international economic order based on sovereign equality, 
interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States, as well as to encourage the 
observance and realization of human rights.’313 
 
China’s White Paper further clearly stipulates that China will never attach any political 
conditionality to foreign aid. The question however arises if this is still the case in reality? Or is 
the reality otherwise? 
 
3.5.3 Conditionalities of Chinese development assistance in Cameroon 
 
Officially, China does not impose any political conditionality on Cameroon or any other African 
country.
314
 Generally, agreements with China essentially present China’s commercial or 
economic interests in return for assistance.
315
 Nevertheless several authors have observed that 
there is always an undisclosed political clause imposed on African countries dealing with China, 
namely, the recognition of the ‘one China principle’.316 Consequently China has always denied 
its development assistance to countries treating with Taiwan, but has always developed and 
strengthened co-operation with countries not having or which have ceased relationships with 
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Taiwan.
317
 Moreover, the legal framework of China’s development assistance to Cameroon also 
includes the modalities and areas that it covers. 
 
3.5.4 Modalities and areas of China’s development assistance to Cameroon 
 
According to the Chinese Paper on Foreign Aid, China’s development assistance to Cameroon is 
divided into three modalities namely: grants, interest free loans and concessional loans.
318
 The 
first two are provided by China’s state finances and the last is granted by the Exim Bank of 
China.
319
 In terms of China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid, grants are also described as ‘gratis 
aid’ aimed at financing the construction of hospitals, schools and other medium and small social 
welfare projects, as well as facilitating technical cooperation and emergency humanitarian aid.
320
 
 
While interest free loans are utilised to assist the recipient country in building public facilities 
and initiating projects to upgrade people’s standard of living, they are actually 20 year contracts 
with five years of payment, five years of grace and ten years of repayment.
321
 However, 
concessional loans are used for large and medium sized infrastructure projects and for projects 
producing both economic and social benefits for the recipient country, and they earn interest.
322
 
The current interest rate of China’s concessional loans is between 2% und 3% with a period of 
repayment of 15 to 20 years plus five to seven years of grace.
323
 In accordance with these 
modalities, China’s development assistance appears to be less costly. 
 
Additionally, these financial resources are invested in the recipient country’s following key 
areas: agriculture; industry; economic infrastructure; public facilities and education and medical 
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and health care, all with the focus on improving a recipient country’s industrial and agricultural 
productivity, thus laying a solid foundation for its economic and social development as well as 
improving basic education and health care.
324
 China is specifically targetting these sectors as it 
defined them as Cameroon’s development indicators.325  
 
Moreover, throughout recent decades, climate change has become an innovative area for China's 
foreign aid.
326
 In terms of the White Paper ‘China was one of the first countries which have 
developed clean energy sources such as bio-gas and small hydropower stations.’ Furthermore, 
the framework constitutes an essential component of China’s development assistance. 
 
3.5.5 Framework of China’s development assistance in Cameroon 
 
In terms of China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid, China’s development assistance is provided in 
eight forms, namely: completed projects, goods and services, technical cooperation, human 
resource co-operation, Chinese medical teams working abroad, overseas volunteers’ programs, 
emergency humanitarian aid, and, lastly, debt relief.
327
 
 
However, many scholars have mentioned that the exact amount of Chinese aid in Africa is 
officially unknown for diverse reasons.
328
 According to Grimm, what makes it difficult to 
estimate the exact amount of Chinese aid in Africa is the fact that there is no concrete borderline 
between aid and commercial activities, such as, trade and investment.
329
 It is important to stress 
at this stage that the fact that China has never published any legal agreement with figures and 
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statistical indicators of its development assistance to Africa generally and Cameroon specifically 
is inappropriate in light of public policies framework requirements which require that public 
policies have to be duly monitored and evaluated in order to scientifically assess their success or 
failure.
330
 Brautigam added that the exact volume of Chinese aid is unknown because China 
neither collates it nor reports it like the OECD governments do.
331
 Additionally, Khan and Baye 
argued that Cameroon documentation relative to China’s development assistance is extremely 
limited and biased because it is not evaluated and monitored.
332
 Because of various limitations, 
China’s development assistance has also been criticised for being ambiguous. 
 
Nevertheless, in terms of China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid, China’s development assistance 
to Cameroon is mostly infrastructure driven and complies with the new strategic partnership 
defined by the Beijing Summit of FOCAC in 2006.
333
 Due to the unavailability and inaccuracy 
of information regarding China’s development assistance framework in Cameroon, this section 
will exclusively describe sectors which China’s development assistance includes in Cameroon.  
 
According to African Forum Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), China’s 
involvement in infrastructure projects in Cameroon really started in 1977, with a donation for the 
construction of the Presidential Palace (Unity Palace) and the National Congress Hall in 
Yaoundé.
334
 Thus, China’s development infrastructure projects in Cameroon in 1982 are 
strengthened with the construction of the National Congress Hall in Yaoundé.
335
 Additionally, 
other prominent projects consist of the Lagdo Dam built in 1984, the 200 bed Gyno-obstetrics 
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and Pediatric Hospital in Yaoundé completed in 2002, and the Sports Hall constructed in 
2009.
336
 From 2002 the China Geological Engineering Group Company and the China Hydro-
power Foreign Project Company committed to explore oil, drill, and build projects as private 
contractors, by means of financial support received from the Chinese government, through the 
EXIM Bank.
337
 
 
Furthermore, other Chinese infrastructures in Cameroon include a sewing workshop as well as 
well sinking and road building projects executed by the China Geological Engineering Group 
and the China Hydropower Foreign Project.
338
 In the light of the China White Paper on Foreign 
Aid, China’s development assistance to Cameroon also embraces the education, agriculture, 
health, culture and tourism sectors subsequent to the conclusion of a range of general 
cooperation agreements for concessional loans in 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2004. 
339
 These general 
agreements were signed with open clauses, accepting Cameroon’s selection of specific projects 
for provision of the corresponding financial resources.
340
 The reason for this is that China 
particularly respects its principle of non-interference and the five principles of peaceful co-
existence generally enshrined in its White Paper on Foreign Aid. In so doing, China 
acknowledges Cameroon’s sovereignty concerning its internal affairs.341 
 
In addition, China’s development assistance to Cameroon includes technical assistance. As a 
result Chinese medical workers have been working in Cameroon since 1975 under a technical 
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cooperation agreement.
342
 Likewise, every year China grants hundreds of scholarships to 
Cameroonian students, under a similar technical cooperation agreement targeting the education 
sector, signed in 1996.
343
 
 
According to Jansson, China’s development assistance to Cameroon also includes the education 
sector.
344
 Thus, a programme is currently in process for the construction of primary schools, 
while a biological laboratory was instituted at the University of Yaoundé.
345
 China’s Zhejiang 
Normal University implemented a Chinese language teaching centre in Yaoundé in 1997.
346
 The 
centre is regarded by China as a bind of friendship between China and Africa.
347
 It has offered 
training for more than 300 professionals, amongst whom were Cameroonians from diplomatic 
and foreign trade circles, and others from neighbouring African countries.
348
 
 
According to AFRODAD, China’s development assistance to Cameroon also includes military 
assistance.
349
 Although the literature does not provide much information in this regard, there are 
some indications thereof, such as, the various relations between Chinese and Cameroon military 
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officials.
350
 Also, the available literature reveals that Cameroon military staff frequently travels 
to China for training.
351
 
 
Above all, China’s development assistance also targets Cameroon’s debt reduction.352 According 
to AFRODAD, China also participated in the HIPC debt reduction program of the IMF and the 
World Bank by cutting an amount of 16 billion FCFA from Cameroon’s debt although China is 
not an OECD member and was not obliged to do so.
353
 In the same vein Khan and Baye 
mentioned that China has cancelled Cameroon’s debt twice in 2001 and in 2007.354 First China 
cancelled a debt of US$34 million as a result of the first China-Africa Forum for Economic and 
Social Development held in Beijing; the second debt cancellation for an amount of US$ 32 
million occurred during Hu Jintao’s visit to Cameroon.355 Although China’s development aid 
represents an unprecedented opportunity for Africa’s development,356 it remains a limited 
instrument as will be illustrated below. 
 
3.6 Critical legal analysis of China’s development assistance approach in Cameroon  
 
This section provides a critical analysis of China’s development assistance approach with regard 
to the White Paper and in respect of states’ international obligations. In fact, China’s 
development assistance has raised a certain number of concerns from traditional donors and 
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African countries as well, at various levels.
357
 However, this section will merely focus on the 
most relevant ones. The following will be examined: China development assistance is free of 
political conditionalities, is mostly tied to procurement, supports undemocratic and corrupt 
regimes, targets primarily access to natural resources and a market for Chinese exports, is likely 
to create new debt problems, and is insufficient. 
 
3.6.1 China’s development assistance is free of political conditionalities 
 
China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid clearly stipulates that China provides development 
assistance ‘…without imposing any political conditions on recipient countries…’ 358 According 
to Brautigam, the Chinese believe that development is not always linked to good governance or 
democracy.
359
 Inspired by its own experience at home, China believes that the widespread 
corruption happening in their own country did not prevent it from being developed and becoming 
the second most powerful country in the world.
360
 Moreover, it believes that, development is a 
process and that imposing conditionalities on African countries is harmful as they hurt 
opportunities for growth.
361
 For these reasons, China has been hugely criticised by western 
donors on many ground, such as, undermining democracy, good governance efforts, and human 
rights, failing to stimulate development, weakening social environment standards, as well as 
increasing corruption.
362
 While Western donors perceive the absence of political conditionalities 
as a grievous obstacle to China’s model of economic development, the absence rather constitutes 
the main reason for the attractiveness of China’s development assistance approach for African 
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countries generally and Cameroon in particular.
363
 Despite this contentious debate, China has 
opted for an unconditional approach to avoid repeating the mistakes of the ‘West’s aid 
dilemma’.364 Concluding this debate, Dambissa has said that good governance is not always a 
prerequisite for development; what matters is the positive investment of the swindled money 
inside the country.
365
  
 
In addition, with regard to international conventions
366
 relative to the respect of state 
sovereignty, and in accordance with China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid, China by not imposing 
conditionalities upon Cameroon has fully complied with this exigency. Therefore, even if the 
IMF and the World Bank are right in saying that good governance matters in the development 
process
367
, it is not the responsibility of either China or the USA, but fully of the Cameroonian 
authorities to make it happen, as a sovereign and independent state. Moreover, China’s 
development assistance was also reproached for being tied to procurement. 
 
3.6.2 China’s development assistance is mostly tied to procurement 
 
Although it was earlier mentioned that China does not impose political conditionalities
368
 it does 
impose economic conditionalities on African countries which is partially in violation of Article 1 
of the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC which stipulates: ‘...No country or group of countries 
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has the right …to impose unilateral coercive economic measures on others.’369 As a matter of 
fact, China’s development assistance has often been tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and 
services.
370
 Therefore, it has been heavily criticised in Africa in general and in Cameroon 
specifically for not involving a significant number of the local population in the execution of 
projects. Khan and Baye in this regard have stated that while ‘... Cameroonians only perform the 
very low-skilled tasks such as cleaning, driving and general labour...’, Chinese companies are the 
ones executing development projects at the top level with imported Chinese labour and assuring 
maintenance work as well.
371
 Consequently, this Chinese attitude has been heavily criticised for 
destroying Cameroon local industries by importing all construction material from China and for 
not enabling technological transfer; thus condemning African countries generally and Cameroon 
in particular to eternally rely on China.
372
 In so doing, China has infringed its White Paper on 
Foreign Aid according to which China is supposed to dispatch ‘...experts to give technical 
guidance on production, operation or maintenance of complete projects...’ in order to strengthen 
recipient countries’ ‘...self-development capacity, enrich and improve their people’s livelihood, 
and promote their economic growth and social progress...’.373 
 
In addition, Cheru and Obi stated that Chinese companies utilise ‘poor labour practice and 
extremely harsh working conditions which is contrary to human rights dignity’.374 In so doing 
China is trespassing upon international human rights instruments and specifically Article.3 (2) of 
the Declaration on the Right to Development according to which: ‘The realization of the right to 
development requires full respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly 
relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
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Nations.’375 Additional to the above criticism, the next criticism targets China’s principle of non-
interference. 
 
3.6.3 China’s principle of non‐interference in internal affairs tends to support 
undemocratic and corrupt regimes 
 
According to Western donors, China’s principle of non-interference actually represents the major 
accusation against China’s development assistance in Africa generally and in Cameroon in 
particular.
376
 In fact, following the non-interference principle in internal affairs, the Chinese have 
been accused of being indifferent to issues pertaining to democracy, human rights, corruption, 
and good governance in African countries.
377
 For China, what essentially matters is the effective 
delivery of services and projects agreed upon in accordance with cooperation agreements. 
Consequently, China’s development assistance is merely viewed as business rather than 
politically or morally orientated.
378
 Nevertheless, the non-interference in internal affairs is not 
regarded by African countries generally and by Cameroon in particular as a criticism, but rather 
constitutes a major reason for the attractiveness of China’s development assistance.379 
 
Despite this criticism, the non- interference principle indeed constitutes the merit of China’s 
development assistance because with regard to United Nations Charter and international public 
law principles no country has the international right or duty to interfere in any other country on 
any ground except in exceptional circumstances or a state of emergency.
380
 Moreover, China by 
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respecting the non-interference principle in recipient countries’ internal affairs has complied with 
international principles and specifically with its White Paper on Foreign Aid which emphasises 
‘…that every country should explore a development path suitable to its actual conditions.’381 
Nevertheless, criticisms of China’s development assistance do not end here, as the next section 
describes. 
 
3.6.4 China’s development assistance primarily targets access to natural resources and 
markets for Chinese exports 
 
China’s development assistance has been undermined by traditional donors, African countries 
and Cameroon in particular, on the ground that it is primarily targeting natural resources and 
markets for Chinese exports.
382
 In this regard, Condon wrote that Chinese ‘loans are often 
explicitly or implicitly tied to guarantees to market access of African resources; mainly oil’.383 In 
spite of this argument, the author of this mini-thesis believes this criticism is inconsistent and 
inappropriate because China never said that its assistance was genuine. On the contrary, it has 
clearly stated in its White Paper on Foreign Aid, at the FOCAC Summits and in many other 
partnership agreements that its partnership with Africa is a win-win partnership with mutual 
benefits.
384
 Consequently, in targetting access to mineral resources and markets for Chinese 
exports, China is purely and simply acting in conformity with the rules and regulations it agreed 
upon with Africa.
385
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Moreover, the author of this mini-thesis believes there are no cooperation or partnership 
agreements without mutual interests, or win-win benefits; if it were so, then what would be their 
essence? We are living in a capitalist world governed by money and interests and nothing is 
taken for granted. Consequently no state should be expecting any favour from others for nothing. 
However the criticisms do not end here. China’s development assistance has been further 
criticised for its probability to generate new debt problems. 
 
3.6.5 China’s development assistance is likely to create new debt problems 
 
China’s development assistance has raised general anxiety on the part of traditional donors. 386 
African states generally and Cameroon in particular have remained unconcerned, and have been 
peacefully and happily enjoying the assistance to the fullest.
387
 However, this argument remains 
a hypothetical one as it has not yet been proved. In addition, China’s development assistance has 
also been criticised for being insufficient. 
 
3.6.6 Chinese development assistance appears to be insufficient 
 
In 1970, rich countries agreed to institute development assistance at a rate of 0.7% of their gross 
national income.
388
 In 1986 under the Declaration on the Right to Development, this 
commitment was strongly underpinned.
389
 However, according to the OECD:  
‘China has not published data on the financial terms of its foreign aid using the methodology 
defined by the DAC for calculating ODA. 
390
. Nor has China published systematic statistics on its 
co-operation, such as annual amounts of aid provided and detailed breakdown of this aid in terms 
of recipient countries and sectoral distribution’.
391
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Despite the increase in China’s development assistance in Africa in accordance with FOCAC 
commitments
392, the amount of China’s aid to Africa remains unknown and some authors believe 
that it has unfortunately remained below the international standard.
393
 Notwithstanding all these 
criticisms, what are the outcomes of China’s development assistance in Cameroon? 
 
3.7 Assessment of China’s development assistance approach in Cameroon 
 
China’s development assistance approach has incontestably brought some positive impacts to 
Cameroon although some important challenges remain, as it will be discussed below. 
 
3.7.1 Positive impacts of China’s development assistance in Cameroon 
 
China’s development assistance approach has focussed on infrastructure projects and has 
somehow undeniably improved Cameroonian socio-economic living conditions.
394
 The increased 
volume of China’s development assistance as well as debt relief have increased physical and 
human capital with a positive impact on growth and poverty reduction.
395
 For instance, China’s 
development assistance in the health sector has raised the quantity and quality of healthcare 
services in the country. 
 
Moreover China’s development assistance with cheaper resources constitutes a source of funding 
additional to traditional donor finances, enabling Cameroon to finance its development process 
and projects more effectively.
396
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Furthermore, China’s development assistance in the form of projects is concrete, visible, and 
tangible and therefore limits the possibility of swindling by administrators or contractors as 
happens sometimes with Western development assistance generally.
397
 Although China’s 
development assistance approach to Cameroon has been greatly beneficial, what are the 
remaining challenges? 
 
3.7.2 Remaining challenges 
 
Despite the positive benefits of China’s development approach in Cameroon, three major 
challenges need to be properly addressed, viz, poverty reduction, technology transfer and aid 
procurement. In fact the poverty rate has remained very high: 40% of the population are still 
living below the poverty line. Furthermore, with respect to China’s win-win and mutual benefit 
policy, the technology transfer promised via cooperation agreements remains limited. Cameroon 
construction projects are still executed by Chinese companies and Chinese continue to lead 
construction projects in Cameroon while Cameroonians carry on executing insignificant 
functions. As far as procurement is concerned, all construction material is still being purchased 
in China to execute Cameroon projects. In addition, labour standards applied do not conform to 
the human rights international standard pertaining to respect for human rights and dignity.
398
 
Additionally, China’s development assistance in Cameroon is neither transparent, nor evaluated 
nor monitored, making it difficult to scientifically analyse its real impact in Africa. 
 
3.8 Conclusion and recommendations 
 
China’s development assistance approach in Cameroon is a an alternative and challenging 
approach to economic development formulated at the Beijing summit 2006 and based upon the 
win-win policy, the five principles of peaceful co-existence and the eight principles of technical 
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cooperation with other countries. Despite it having been favourable in advancing Cameroon’s 
development, it has been at the centre of multiple criticisms and challenges. 
 
Therefore, in order to be more beneficial to Cameroon and to effectively address poverty 
reduction and advance economic development there is a need for China to review its labour 
practices and to respect human rights and human dignity in Cameroon in accordance with 
international standards.
399
 Furthermore, it is urgent and desirable that China increases its 
financial support to the rate fixed by the international community, namely, 0, 7% of GDP.
400
 
Moreover, there is a pressing need to make the technology transfer effective in Cameroon by 
making construction projects a local business run by Cameroonian companies and empowering 
Cameroonians at the top level of these projects so as to enable them to acquire the necessary 
technical skills they lack. Furthermore, for more transparent development assistance, China’s 
government should take steps to increase the transparency of their development assistance 
projects in Africa in general, and in Cameroon in particular, by officially publishing the exact 
amount of aid granted to Africa as a whole, and to each country in particular, as the OECD 
governments do. Similarly, Cameroon as well as other African countries must release 
information of the exact amount of aid they have received so as to enable a proper monitoring 
and evaluation of China’s development assistance in Africa in general and in Cameroon in 
particularly. 
 
Above all, this mini-thesis supports the view that the key to Cameroon’s economic development 
lies in its own hands: meaning, Cameroon is responsible for its own development. It must stop 
expecting everything from foreign development partners and take full responsibility and proper 
control of its economic development. In so doing, Cameroon should ‘focus on building human 
and institutional capacity, fostering people-centred policy frameworks, promoting good 
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governance, building productive capacities and mobilising more financial resources’.401 Despite 
China’s development assistance’s success stories on the African continent, it remains critical to 
further investigate which development path, that of China or of the IMF-World Bank is best 
suited for Cameroon. 
                                                          
401
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CHAPTER 4 
A COMPARISON OF THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES 
INITIATIVE AGREEMENT AND CHINA’S WHITE PAPER ON FOREIGN AID 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It has been shown that the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Agreement and 
the Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid are two ideologically opposed binding legal 
documents both aimed at reducing poverty and promoting economic development in 
Cameroon.
402
 Unlike the HIPC Initiative Agreement which has specifically focussed on the 
imposition of a set of conditionalities,
403
 China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid has stressed 
infrastructure building without political conditionalities attached.
404
 
 
This chapter is meant to investigate the legal impacts of these two legal documents on 
Cameroon economic development. In so doing, this chapter compares China’s development 
assistance approach and that of the IMF-World Bank in light of their respective backgrounds 
and with regard to the international human rights framework and the international co-
operation agreements universally recognised by the international community, such as, the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and the Declaration on the Right to Development (1986). 
Thus, the present chapter first compares the HIPC Initiative Agreement and China’s White 
Paper on Foreign Aid in terms of their differences and their similarities. Secondly, the chapter 
addresses the mutual benefits and challenges of both development assistance approaches to 
Cameroon. Above all, this chapter further emphasises the need of China to co-operate with 
the IMF and the World Bank under a multilateral legal framework in order to effectively 
achieve their common goals of poverty reduction and economic development in Cameroon. 
The first point to be examined in this regard is the differences between the HIPC Initiative 
Agreement and China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid. 
 
                                                          
402
 Chapters 2.4.1 and 3.5.1. 
403‘Debt Relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative’ International Monetary Fund 
Factsheet’ available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (accessed 21 September 2012). 
404
 China White on Foreign Aid (22 April 2011). 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
4.2 Differences between the HIPC Initiative Agreement and China’s White Paper on 
Foreign Aid 
 
In light of their respective legal backgrounds earlier presented in chapters 2 and 3, the 
following subsections intend to provide a comparison of the HIPC Initiative Agreement and 
China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid in terms of their characteristics, their implementation, 
and their reception.  
 
4.2.1 Differences pertaining to their characteristics 
 
In the discussions in chapter 2 it was said that the HIPC Initiative Agreement is structured 
upon the multilateral co-operation led by the IMF and the World Bank and focussed on the 
imposition of an economic reform package (such as, good governance, respect for human 
rights, implementation of democratic institutions, and implementation of good 
macroeconomic policies) whose successful implementation would result in the allocation of 
financial resources which have to be spent to finance poverty reduction expenditures.
405
 
According to this approach, a good economic policy environment is the sine qua non for 
poverty reduction and economic prosperity in Cameroon. Thus, by imposing a respect for 
human rights and dignity, it appears that the IMF and the World Bank have complied with 
states’ international obligations to respect human rights and dignity as enshrined in the 
United Nations Charter and specifically Article 6(1) of the Declaration on the Right to 
Development which provides that ‘[a]ll States should co-operate with a view to promoting, 
encouraging and strengthening universal respect for and observance of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all…’. 
 
Moreover, as previously illustrated in chapter 2, deeply convinced of the capacity of their 
values, norms and system to foster economic development, the IMF and the World Bank have 
subsequently imposed a set of political conditionalities upon Cameroon as a prerequisite for 
the grant of development assistance.
406
 Thus, in the development assistance process, the IMF 
and the World Bank identify themselves as donors and treat Cameroon as a recipient.
407
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Hence, in this co-operation, solely the IMF and the World Bank are establishing the rules of 
the game; while Cameroon, as a powerless and voiceless recipient, is forced to remain silent 
and to quietly abide by these unilaterally established rules.
408
 However, under Article II 3(a) 
of the Bretton Woods Agreements ‘each member shall subscribe shares of the capital stock of 
the Bank’. This means that the amount of subscription to be paid by each member is neither 
specified nor limited; therefore Cameroon as a member of the Bretton Woods Institutions and 
as a country rich in oil and mineral resources could raise its subscription capital in order to 
increase its bargaining power vis-a- vis the Bretton Woods Institutions. 
 
In addition to this unequal partnership which characterises the donor-recipient relationship, it 
was further mentioned in chapter 2 that the IMF and the World Bank through their 
conditionalities policy have been constantly interfering in Cameroon’s internal affairs and 
consequently undermining the country’s sovereignty and independence.409 Therefore, it was 
concluded that the imposition of conditionalities is contrary not only to the sacrosanct 
principle of the respect for state sovereignty according to which no country has the 
international right or duty to interfere in any other country on any ground except in 
exceptional circumstances or a state of emergency, 
410
 but also to Article 3(3) of the 
Declaration on the Right to Development which prescribes that ‘[s]tates should realize their 
rights and fulfil their duties in such a manner as to promote a new international economic 
order based on sovereign equality...’. 
 
However, As indicated in chapter 3, China opted for a different and specific approach to 
poverty reduction and economic development which does not impose political 
conditionalities upon Cameroon except for the ‘one China principle’ based on the non-
recognition of Taiwan, and is focussed on infrastructure building.
411
 In fact, it was outlined in 
chapter 3 that China through its development assistance is actually repeating its home-based 
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development model in Africa generally and in Cameroon in particular.
412
 Thus, when 
delivering development assistance to Cameroon, China does it in terms of a bilateral 
partnership characterised by equality, mutual benefits, the non-imposition of political 
conditionalities, and with respect for Cameroon sovereignty through non-interference in its 
internal affairs.
413
 In so doing, China has conformed to the five principles of peaceful co-
existence embodied in its White Paper on Foreign Aid featuring mutual respect for each 
other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference 
in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.414 
Consequently it was admitted that China has complied with  Article 3(3) of the Declaration 
on the Right to Development which stipulates : 
 
 ‘States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating 
obstacles to development. States should realize their rights and fulfil their duties in such a 
manner as to promote a new international economic order based on sovereign equality, 
interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States, …’. 
 
On the other hand, in delivering its development assistance in Africa generally and in 
Cameroon in particular without taking into consideration respect for human rights and 
dignity, this study revealed that China has contravened to States’ international obligations to 
respect human rights and dignity as enshrined in the United Nations Charter and specifically 
Article 6(1) of the Declaration on the Right to Development which provides that ‘[a]ll States 
should co-operate with a view to promoting, encouraging and strengthening universal respect 
for and observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all…’ and to Article 4 
of the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which 
emphasises that ‘[t]he universality of human rights and fundamental freedoms should be 
respected …’. 
 
In addition, chapters 2 and 3 revealed that the joint IMF-World Bank development assistance 
approach as compared to that of China is more transparent, frequently monitored, and 
evaluated.
415
 Thus, the IMF and the World Bank have always ensured that the HIPC Initiative 
Agreement is being regularly evaluated and monitored by IMF and World Bank experts 
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through frequent country reports, publications and press releases which provide the public 
with all the necessary information pertaining to the implementation of the Agreement by a 
given country. For instance, with regard to the HIPC Initiative in Cameroon the IMF and the 
World Bank released information regarding the progress made by the country in relation to 
the implementation of the HIPC, the difficulties and challenges encountered during the 
implementation of the HIPC, and the exact amount of debt relief that the country will receive 
after the successful implementation of the program.
416
 
 
Unfortunately, that has never been the case with China’s development assistance. In Chapter 
3 it was shown that China’s development assistance is not transparent as it has remained a 
‘state secret’, which makes it difficult to know the exact amount of China’s development 
assistance in Cameroon.
417
 In addition, it was also mentioned that China’s development 
assistance approach is neither monitored nor evaluated through statistical or legal documents 
which make it difficult to accurately assess the impact thereof and that consequently China 
has failed to meet the scientific public policy framework requirements in terms of monitoring 
and evaluation.
418
 This means that the Chinese government does not officially release country 
reports or publications like the IMF and the World Bank do. However, this does not mean 
that China does not evaluate and monitor its development assistance at all. In fact, it was 
mentioned in chapter 3 that China monitors its development assistance on a regular basis 
through the White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation and the FOCAC 
Summits, the last of which was held in 2012.
419
 However, the Centre for Chinese Studies of 
the University of Stellenbosch (CCS) is one of the reputable African institutions which has so 
far made efforts to appropriately monitor and evaluate China’s development assistance.420 In 
this regard the CCS has issued various publications pertaining to the assessment of China’s 
                                                          
416
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development assistance in many African countries.
421
 Additionally, the difference between 
the HIPC Initiative and China’s White Paper does not end here. They also differ in terms of 
their implementation. This will be discussed in the next subsection. 
 
4.2.2 Differences pertaining to their legal implementation  
 
In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that Cameroon has successfully implemented all the 
conditionalities imposed by the IMF and the World Bank under the HIPC Initiative 
Framework for reaching its decision and completion point.
422
 Therefore, it was acknowledged 
that Cameroon has successfully implemented the HIPC Initiative Agreement which led it to 
achieve good macro-economic results in terms of good governance, the fight against 
corruption, budgetary savings from debt relief, and in the education, health and HIV/AIDS 
sectors.
423
 
 
However, without being in favour of the IMF’s and the World Bank’s conditionalities, it 
appears that, although fundamentally and politically incorrect with regard to the sacrosanct 
principle of State sovereignty, they have in some way obliged Cameroon to make efforts 
towards improving its macro-economic environment, to respect human rights and dignity and 
subsequently oriented Cameroon on the path of good governance and economic 
development.
424
 According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
(TICPI) 2012, it appears that Cameroon which used to be the world’s most corrupt country 
according to TICPI 1998, has made some progress in the fight against the corruption which 
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led it to be ranked in 2012 as the 144
th 
most corrupt country out of 176 participating 
countries.
425
  
 
As far as China’s development assistance is concerned, it was mentioned in chapter 3 that 
China’s development assistance framework in Cameroon has conformed to China’s 
development assistance framework for Africa as embodied in China’s White Paper on 
Foreign Aid in terms of the following: completed projects, goods and services, technical co-
operation, human resource co-operation, Chinese medical teams working abroad, overseas 
volunteers’ programs, emergency humanitarian aid, and, lastly, debt relief.426 
 
In addition it was mentioned that China’s development assistance in Cameroon follows 
respect for the five principles of peaceful co-existence embodied in its White Paper on 
Foreign Aid featuring mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 
mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and 
mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.
427
 
 
But with regard to the international obligation imposed on States to respect human rights and 
dignity in their co-operation with other States, it was shown that China has failed to comply 
with this exigency in Cameroon where China’s development assistance was provided in 
violation of human rights.
428
 Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 3, China‘s development 
assistance in Cameroon is mostly tied to procurement of Chinese goods and services and 
Khan and Baye observed that‘... Cameroonians only perform the very low-skilled tasks such 
as cleaning, driving and general labour...’429 , while Chinese companies are the ones 
executing development projects at the top level with imported Chinese labour and assuring 
maintenance work as well. This Chinese attitude has, first, disregarded Article 1 of the 
Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC which stipulates that ‘... [n]o country or group of 
                                                          
425‘Transparency International Corruption Perception Index’ 2012 available at 
http://www.transparency.org.ro/politici_si_studii/indici/ipc/2012/CPI2012_map%20and%20country%20results
.pdf (accessed 5 May 2012). 
426
 Chapter 3.5.5. 
427
 Chapter 3.5.2. 
428
 Chapter 3.6.2. 
429
 Chapter 3.6.2. 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
countries has the right …to impose unilateral coercive economic measures on others.’430 In 
addition to this violation, the Chinese attitude was also heavily criticised for not enabling 
technological transfer, and consequently for making Cameroon to eternally rely on China.
431
 
In so doing, it appears that China has failed to comply with both Principles 7 and 4 of China's 
Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries embodied in  
China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid which emphasise that in technical co-operation with 
other countries China will make sure that the recipient country fully masters the technology 
in such a way that it does not depend on China but embark step by step on the path of self-
reliance and independent economic development. Thus, Principle 7 declares that ‘[i]n giving 
any particular technical assistance, the Chinese government will see to it that the personnel of 
the recipient country fully master the technology.’ In addition to this, principle 4 states that  
‘[i]n providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese government is not to make 
recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of 
self-reliance and independent economic development.’ Moreover China’s development 
assistance approach and the HIPC Initiative Agreement differ in terms of their reception. This 
aspect will be elaborated below. 
 
4.2.3 Differences pertaining to their reception  
 
The HIPC Initiative Agreement has not always been well received in Africa in general 
432
 and 
in Cameroon particularly, because it was interfering in recipient countries’ internal affairs 
and sovereignty through the imposition of political conditionalities, and yet achieved 
mitigated results on the ground.
433
 Thus, in chapter 2 it was shown that although the HIPC 
Initiative Agreement has yielded some positive results in terms of macro-economic stability 
in Cameroon with regard to significant debt reduction achieved, debt sustainability has not 
been reached for the long term. 
434
 Moreover it was acknowledged that in spite of some 
improvements in primary education and ensuring gender equality, more than half of HIPCs 
that have achieved their post-completion point including Cameroon are unlikely to meet their 
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Consequently, it was said that the main challenge 
of the HIPC Initiative Agreement has remained the enhancement of investment and economic 
growth rates so as to significantly reduce poverty.
435
  
 
However, China’s development assistance approach to Africa in general and to Cameroon in 
particular has been well received. First, because they both share a colonial history and a 
southern identity
436
, and secondly because it presents certain advantages that the IMF and the 
World Bank debt relief Initiative does not offer.
437
 For instance, as noted in chapter 3, 
China’s development assistance approach to Cameroon, in contrast to that of the IMF and the 
World Bank, is quicker 
438
 (Chinese approach on development projects is unilateral, while the 
IMF and the World Bank approach is multilateral given that the IMF and the World Bank are 
multilateral institutions); non-interfering, in the sense that China does not officially impose 
political conditionalities;
439
 and  more affordable as compared to that of the IMF-World Bank 
and with regard to Principle 5 of China's Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical 
Assistance to Other Countries which prescribes that ‘[t]he Chinese government does its best 
to help recipient countries complete projects which require less investment but yield quicker 
results, so that the latter may increase their income and accumulate capital.’ Moreover, the 
nature of China’s development assistance to Cameroon tied to procurement (the fact that 
China’s infrastructures and development projects in Cameroon are generally executed by 
Chinese firms at the top level with imported Chinese labour and they are also responsible for 
maintenance work as well) has appeared to be less open to corruption as compared to that of 
the IMF-World Bank whereby the debt relief assistance granted is frequently misused for 
public servants’ and project contractors’ personal ends or projects rather than social 
spending.
440
 However, Chapter 3 has also criticised the Chinese attitude of tying aid to 
procurement in so far as it is negatively impacting on local industries and at the same time is 
                                                          
435
 Chapter 2.8. 
436
 See the Preamble of the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC. See also Mohan G & Power M ‘New African 
Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement in Africa and the changing Architecture of International 
Development’ (2008) 35 Review of African Political Economy 23-42, 24. 
437
 Birell I ‘The Dragon’s Gift by Deborah Brautigam’ (1 January 2010) Book review available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/the-dragons-gift-by-deborah-brautigam-
1854588.html (accessed 5 May 2013). 
438
 Chapter 3.5.2. 
439
 Chapter 3.6.1. 
440
 Chapter 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
not promoting technological transfer.
441
 Although the HIPC Initiative Agreement and China’s 
approach are quiet divergent in certain respects, they do share some common characteristics 
as it will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4.3 Similarities between China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid and the HIPC Initiative 
Agreement 
 
In light of the discussions in chapters 2 and 3 it appears that the HIPC Initiative Agreement 
and China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid present some similarities in terms of their drives, 
their objectives and some of their common challenges. Each of these points will be illustrated 
below. 
 
4.3.1 Similarities regarding their drives 
 
The analysis in chapters 2 and 3 found that neither China’s development assistance approach 
nor the IMF-World Bank debt reduction Initiative are genuine aid 
442
 or grants 
443
 in the pure 
sense, but strategically driven.
 
 Article 3 of the Declaration on the Right to Development 
recognised the right of States to ‘… promote a new international economic order based on 
sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States…’. 
Moreover, according to the popular saying which declares that ‘States do not have friends but 
only interests’: in respect of their investments in Cameroon both development partners are 
primarily seeking after and striving for their self-interest 
444
 while Cameroon is benefitting 
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from the development partners’ investments.445 Therefore, this co-operation appears to be 
gainful to all the three partners. In addition to their similarities relating to their drives, both 
development assistance approaches also share similar objectives, as it will be discussed 
below. 
 
4.3.2 Similarities regarding their objectives 
 
According to China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid and the HIPC Initiative Agreement, the 
ultimate objective of both China’s development assistance approach and the IMF-World 
Bank debt reduction Initiative approach in Cameroon is to reduce the poverty level and 
enhance Cameroon’s economic development.446 In order to meet these objectives, it was 
noted in Chapter 2 that the HIPC Initiative Agreement was initially designed to provide debt 
sustainability to HIPCs by resolving their long-lasting debt crises in a sustainable way.
447
 
Afterward, the Initiative aimed at raising long term growth rates by removing the debt 
surplus.
448
 Lastly it focussed on poverty reduction by freeing up resources from debt service 
payment for higher social spending such as education, health and others social services.
449
 
 
In Chapter 3, in order to achieve poverty reduction and enhance economic development in 
Cameroon, it was highlighted that China opted for an infrastructure oriented development 
assistance approach since it believes that infrastructures building is what Cameroon and 
Africa really need to achieve poverty reduction and economic development.
450
 In addition to 
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their objectives, the IMF-World Bank approach and China’s approach seem to share to some 
extend some mutual challenges. 
 
4.3.3 Similarities regarding some mutual challenges 
 
The discussions in chapters 2 and 3 concluded that, the approaches of both the joint IMF-
World Bank and China in Cameroon specifically and in Africa generally are similar in so far 
as both share some mutual challenges. These include: aid tied to procurement, insufficiency 
of the financial development assistance provided which remained below the rate commonly 
agreed on by the international community and fixed at 0, 7%; and more importantly, lack of 
Cameroon development effort initiatives and sound democratic structures and institutions. As 
a result their development assistance efforts have been less productive; in as far as they both 
failed to effectively reduce poverty in Cameroon. 
451
 In spite of these weaknesses, both 
development assistance approaches remain beneficial to Cameroon. 
 
4.4 Cameroon’s benefits from the HIPC Initiative Agreement and China’s White Paper 
on Foreign Aid 
 
Although both the HIPC Initiative Agreement and China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid 
remain limited, as they have been hampered by some implementation constraints on the part 
of both the donors (China, the IMF and the World Bank) and the recipient (Cameroon) which 
have made their development assistance effort less productive, it is undeniable that they have 
together somehow contributed to advancing Cameroon’s economic development.452Although 
it has been previously indicated that the HIPC Initiative Agreement yielded contrasted 
outcomes in Cameroon,
453
 in light of IMF and World Bank reports it appears that it has 
enabled Cameroon to some extent to achieve good macroeconomic progress and some 
development advancement taking into consideration Cameroon’s successful implementation 
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of all the triggers required for reaching its floating completion point.
454
 It is, for instance, the 
successful implementation of macroeconomic and structural reforms and the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which have enabled Cameroon to reduce the pace of 
corruption, improve good governance, and enhance public service, health, education and 
socio-economic development.
455
 
 
It has also been shown in Chapter 3 that China’s development assistance has enabled 
Cameroon to achieve some macro-economic advancement through improving socio-
economic living conditions by cancelling Cameroon’s debt, building health, educational and 
social infrastructures in Cameroon and increasing its aid volume.
456
 Since both assistance 
approaches are still facing some mutual challenges and have, at the same time, great merit; as 
indicated earlier, 
457
 it can be argued that the creation of a new multilateral legal framework 
including traditional donors, China and the Bretton Woods Institutions would be a better 
approach for Cameroon’s economic development in particular and for Africa in general. 
 
4.5 The creation of a new multilateral legal framework including China and the Bretton 
Woods Institutions would be a better approach for Cameroon 
 
Many scholars have outlined the need for China to cooperate with other donors, namely, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the IMF and the World 
Bank in terms of a specialised multilateral platform.
458
 The reason behind this suggestion is 
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that although they appear intrinsically divergent in terms of values and system, they both 
share the common goal of alleviating poverty in Africa and promoting economic 
development.
459
 However, China has indicated some reluctance in relation to such 
recommendation on the ground that it does not want to be associated with values and norms it 
did not create in the first place.
460
 It is submitted that this argument constitutes a valid point, 
in the sense that in trying to harmonise both systems under the pre-existing established norms 
of traditional donors could end up killing the spirit and the values of each approach. In 
addition China mentioned that it ‘… do [es] not generally see aid from the West as having 
been very effective in reducing poverty in Africa.’461 However, it is important to highlight 
that Western donors have admitted several times the challenges that their aid system is still 
facing, and for this reason OECD donors, the IMF and the World Bank have conducted 
various international actions and summits in order to improve aid transparency and mutual 
accountability of donors and recipients, which according to them represent the main obstacles 
to the achievement of aid effectiveness in Africa.
462
 According to African Forum and 
Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), these efforts comprise the development of 
Poverty Reduction Strategies, followed in 2000 by the adoption of the MDGs, the Monterrey 
Consensus (March, 2002), the High-Level Forum on Aid Harmonisation in Rome (February 
2003), the Round Table on Aid Management, centred on results in terms of development, 
held in Marrakech (2004), the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of February 2005, the 
Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra in September 2008, and the 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan in Korea in November 2011.
463
 
All these international agreements define the goals and objectives of the agenda for aid 
effectiveness.  
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Although China is not party to these various international agreements, and is still somewhat 
reluctant to associate itself with other donors, AFRODAD pointed out that ‘[d]onors are 
increasingly willing to align their actions with Cameroon’s strategies and policies’464 as it 
was decided under the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
465
 Thus, through its 
development assistance, it appears that China is among the countries willing to assist 
Cameroon on the path of economic emergence following Cameroon’s authorities’ vision 
2035.
466
 Furthermore China has supported efforts made by Western donors to reduce debt 
burdens of HIPCs in light of Article 8 of the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC which states: 
  
‘[W]e welcome the laudable efforts made by certain middle income countries and other 
bilateral initiatives by donors aimed at the cancellation of African official debts. We 
appreciate the recent enhancement of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, 
geared at relieving the debt burden and alleviating poverty, particularly in Africa. We stress 
that the HIPC initiative is being undertaken against the background of the decline in ODA to 
historical levels and that the rescheduling of Africa's debt must not be conducted with 
political strings attached or at the expense of official development assistance. We strongly 
appeal to the relevant international financial institutions and creditor developed countries to 
adopt more concrete measures aimed at debt relief and reduction for the least developed and 
middle income African countries. We welcome concrete measures and contribution to be 
made in this regard by China, a developing country itself.’467  
 
According to this statement, it appears that China supports the efforts made so far by the IMF 
and the World Bank under the HIPC Initiative to reduce the debt burden of poor countries. 
However, China does not favour the system of the imposition of political conditionalities 
upon poor countries under the justification of the development assistance. Consequently, 
although China and the Bretton Woods Institution share the same goal of reducing the debt 
burden of poor countries, for China, imposing political conditionalities is not the appropriate 
way to deal with development assistance. Thus it is appealing to developed countries to 
financially assist developing countries without any political conditionality attached, as it has 
suggested under its development assistance approach to Africa in general. As shown in 
chapter 3, China is delivering its development assistance to Africa without political 
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conditionalities attached. Besides, as indicated, Khan and Baye have shown that China has 
participated in the HIPC debt reduction program by cancelling Cameroon’s debt twice, in 
2001 and in 2007.
468
 First, China cancelled a debt of US$34 million as the result of the first 
China-Africa Forum for Economic and Social Development held in Beijing; secondly it 
cancelled a debt amount of US$ 32 million during Hu Jintao’s visit to Cameroon.469 
 
Given China’s reluctance to adhere to a specialised platform with other donors, in terms of 
the analysis of both developments assistance approach frameworks above, it is submitted that 
the creation of a new multilateral legal framework including the OECD donors China, the 
IMF and the World Bank would be a better approach given that each approach valuably 
complements the others.
470
 In so doing, the new multilateral framework should incorporate 
the positive legal aspects of each approach. 
 
Regarding the IMF and the World Bank debt reduction approach the following legal aspects 
should be borne in mind: 
 
  respect for human rights and dignity; 
   transparency of development assistance through publishing legal documents, such 
as, treaties, conventions, and statistical reports related to the aid framework including, 
for instance, aid granted to Africa in general and the amounts received by each 
specific country, their modalities and the socio-economic aspects covered be it health, 
education, or construction; and 
 advocating the monitoring and evaluation system under the new multilateral legal 
framework through regular reports on each country, including what the country has 
implemented so far, what it has achieved, the difficulties it encountered, and what 
measures donors intend to implement to address those challenges. 
Above all, the following five principles of aid effectiveness advocated in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) by the IMF, World Bank and OECD donors 
should be advanced: 
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1. ‘Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, 
improve their institutions and tackle corruption. 
2. Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local system. 
3. Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinated simplify procedure and share 
information to avoid duplication. 
4. Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and 
results get measured. 
5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results’. 
 
In the case of China, the following legal aspects should be maintained: 
 the five principles of peaceful co-existence; 
  respect for state sovereignty; 
  respect for the principle of non-interference; 
  non-imposition of political conditionalities; and  
  respect for the principle of equality and mutual benefit in international cooperation. 
 
In so doing, the creation of a new multilateral legal framework incorporating all these legal 
aspects presents a better chance to effectively address poverty issues and economic 
development in poor countries given that it incorporates each development actors’ values and 
norms and all of them (namely the OECD donors, the IMF, the World Bank, China and 
developing countries) are actively participating in the development process. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The HIPC Initiative Agreement and China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid offer two specific 
and distinctive development assistance approaches aimed at reducing poverty and fostering 
economic development in Cameroon.
471
 While the HIPC Initiative Agreement places 
emphasis on values, such as, conditionalities and structural reforms, such as, the 
implementation of good governance structures and institutions, China’s approach places 
emphasis on infrastructure building without imposing political conditionalities.
472
 Although 
both approaches present some differences in terms of their characteristics, their legal 
implementation and the results achieved, as well as their reception, as shown earlier, they do 
share at the same time some common similarities with regard to their drives, their objectives 
and some of their challenges. Despite the challenges the HIPC Initiative and China White 
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Paper are still facing, it was admitted that both approaches complement each one. For this 
reason some scholars suggested that a specialised platform should be created in order to 
harmonise the development assistance approach of China with that of traditional donors, 
amongst which the IMF and the World Bank, so as to make development assistance in 
African countries more effective. However, China has been somewhat reluctant to agree with 
this suggestion on the ground that it did not want to be associated with values and norms it 
had not created in the first place.
473
 Moreover, it expressed some degree of reluctance on the 
ground that in its view traditional donors’ development assistance has been ineffective so far 
in reducing poverty in Africa. However, despite these arguments it was also observed that 
China has shown some degree of willingness to participate in traditional donors’ development 
efforts initiative several times, such as, the debt cancellation initiated by the IMF and the 
World Bank, and the aid alignment with recipient countries’ priorities decided under the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. For these reasons it was concluded that the creation of a 
new multilateral legal framework including China, the IMF, the World Bank and the OED 
donors would be a better approach for Cameroon, given that such framework would 
incorporate the positive norms of each approach. 
 
Although Cameroon economic development is a joint responsibility with the international 
community,
474
 it remains Cameroon’s primary responsibility to take its destiny in its own 
hands, because governments, institutions and organisations which do not act strategically in 
accordance with the rise of China might forever be marginalised’.475 In this regard, the 
Brussels Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) for the decade 
2001-2010 recommended the following: 
 
‘… LDCs must continue domestic efforts for reform and reorganization by improving 
efficiency, transparency and accountability, and facilitating the emergence of governance 
structures and business-friendly environments. The international community, meanwhile, 
must fulfill its commitments to establish an enabling environment not only through increased 
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and better quality development assistance, but also through increased investment, debt relief 
and free and fair trade.’476 
 
This statement once more emphasises that the issue of the economic development of 
developing countries is a complex task which can only be achieved by the active participation 
of both donor and recipient countries through the implementation of sounds economic 
policies and reforms. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1. Conclusions 
 
This mini-thesis sought to provide a comparison of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (HIPC) Agreement and the Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid in order to 
investigate which approach is best suited for Cameroon economic development, in particular, 
and for Africa, in general.  
  
In order to address this question, chapter 2 presented the HIPC Initiative Agreement. It was 
indicated that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank together launched 
the HIPC Initiative Agreement in 1996 in order to resolve the problem of an excessive 
external debt burden faced by poor countries which significantly impeded their capacity to 
pursue sustainable development and to reduce poverty.
477
 With its agenda aimed at resolving 
the long-lasting debt crises of HIPCs in a sustainable manner, the HIPC Initiative Agreement 
was supported and by about 180 governments at the World Bank and the IMF and regarded 
as a valuable instrument capable to address effectively the unremitting debt rescheduling of 
poor countries.
478
 The HIPC Initiative Agreement provides for two major phases: the decision 
point and the completion point.
479
 During the first phase, countries were required to 
implement certain specific measures in order to be granted interim debt service relief, and 
four conditionalities were to be fulfilled or satisfactorily implemented by the debtor countries 
in order to receive interim debt relief.
480
 The first conditionality is that the debtor country 
should be qualified to borrow interest free loans and grants offered by the World Bank’s 
International Development Agency, and loans to Low Income Countries (LICs) at subsidised 
rates from the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust; secondly, the country must face 
an insupportable debt burden that cannot be resolved with previous debt relief mechanisms; 
thirdly, the country should have established a track record of reform and excellent policies 
through IMF and World Bank supported programs; lastly, the country must have developed a 
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Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) through a broad-based participatory process in the 
country.
481
 After Cameroon’s successful implementation of these requirements on 16 October 
2000, the Boards of the IMF and World Bank approved US$ 1.260 billion worth of debt relief 
at end-June 1999 Net Present Value (NPV) terms under the enhanced HIPC Framework. 
482
 
Then, during the second phase, countries have to additionally implement certain policies and 
meet certain requirements in order to qualify for full assistance. In the case of Cameroon, it 
was required to implement the following six specific steps decided at the decision point: first, 
to prepare a full PRSP and satisfactorily implement it for at least one year; secondly, to 
maintain a stable macroeconomic environment; thirdly, to satisfactorily use budgetary 
savings from the interim debt service relief; fourthly, to satisfactorily implement and 
conclude structural reforms supported by the Third Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC III); 
fifthly, to successfully implement governance and anti-corruption measures, including in the 
areas of judicial and procurement reform, budget execution and creation of regulatory 
agencies; and lastly, to fruitfully implement key social reforms, including combating 
HIV/AIDs.
483
 Unfortunately Cameroon did not meet its completion point as planned by 2003 
but only three years later on 1 May 2006 for two main reasons: the repeated bad performance 
observed in the fiscal arena, and the fact that the government program supported by the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) program was not satisfactorily 
implemented.
484
 Following Cameroon’s completion point attainment on 1 May 2006, the IMF 
granted 100 per cent debt relief on all debt incurred by Cameroon to the IMF before 1 
January 2005, which had not been repaid.
485
 Additionally, Cameroon also qualified for 
supplementary debt relief from International Development Assistance (IDA), the IMF and the 
African Development Fund (AfDF) under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).
486
  
 
However, the HIPC Initiative has faced some criticisms in that: it imposed conditionalities 
upon recipient countries which is contrary to the sacrosanct principle of State sovereignty; the 
resources release by the HIPC Initiative appeared to be insufficient to cover social spending; 
the framework to determine countries eligibility was inappropriate; the HIPC seemed to have 
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failed to achieve growth and debt sustainability; and it did not sufficiently protect countries 
against exogenous shocks.
487
 
 
Despite these criticisms it was acknowledged that the HIPC Initiative Agreement has enabled 
Cameroon to some extent to achieve good macro-economic progress and, subsequently, some 
development advancement taking into consideration Cameroon’s successful implementation 
of all the triggers required for reaching its floating completion point.
488
 It is, for instance, the 
successful implementation of macro-economic and structural reforms and the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which have enabled Cameroon to reduce the pace of 
corruption, improve good governance, and enhance public service, health, education and 
socio-economic development.
489
 Therefore it was concluded that perhaps the real problem 
with the HIPC Initiative Agreement was that its value has been overestimated, though it was 
an essential but slight part of the whole development assistance framework.
490
  
 
Chapter 3 examined China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid. It was noted that, since 1971, 
China has been implementing an innovative development co-operation strategy in Africa and 
in Cameroon, in particular, based upon values and principles which are embodied in the 
Beijing Consensus and featuring win-win co-operation, non-interference in States’ internal 
affairs, absence of political conditionalities, and, above all, focussing on infrastructure 
building.
491
 
 
The study revealed that China’s development assistance has played an important role in 
advancing Cameroon economic development through the construction of infrastructure 
projects and the increased Chinese financial resources given to Cameroon through debt relief 
which have considerably improved Cameroon socio-economic life.
492
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Moreover, it was shown that the Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid just like the HIPC 
Initiative Agreement has been subject to certain criticisms and challenges.
493
 Some of the 
criticisms were the following: China’s development assistance is mostly tied to procurement 
and has threatened Cameroon local industries’ economic prosperity; it tends to support 
undemocratic governments; it primarily targets natural resources and a market for Chinese 
exports, and it is neither transparent nor evaluated nor monitored.
494
 Regarding some of the 
challenges faced by China’s development assistance, the following were identified: the lack 
of transparency; insufficient monitoring and evaluation; the ineffectiveness of technologies 
transfer; its limited ability to effectively tackle poverty issue; and human rights violations.
495
 
 
In conclusion, it was emphasised that there was a need for China to revisit its development 
assistance approach in Cameroon in particular and in Africa in general in order to address the 
above-mentioned challenges and to effectively achieve poverty reduction and economic 
development. Moreover, it was highlighted that Cameroon’s economic development lies in its 
own hands. Therefore, it was said that Cameroon should stop expecting everything from 
foreign development partners and should take full responsibility and proper control of its 
economic development by implementing sound macro-economic reforms.
496
  
 
Chapter 4 focussed on a comparison of the HIPC Initiative Agreement and China’s White 
Paper on Foreign Aid in order to investigate which development assistance approach was 
more suitable for Cameroon’s economic development.497 In order to resolve this contentious 
issue, the Chapter first emphasised the differences between the development assistance 
approaches with regard to their characteristics, their implementation, and their reception.
498
 
Then the Chapter examined their similarities in terms of their drives, their objectives and 
their challenges.
499
 Despite the challenges facing both development assistance approaches
500
, 
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it was also acknowledged that both have great merit because they have somehow participated 
in the advancement of Cameroon economic development today.
501
 
 
Given the limits of both approaches and the fact that they complement each one, some 
scholars early recommended that a specialised platform including traditional donors and 
China should be established.
502
 Unfortunately, China has shown some degree of reluctance to 
accept this suggestion for two mains reasons:  first, that it did not want to be associated with 
values and norms it did not create in the first place, and secondly it emphasised that in its 
own view Western development assistance approach has not been effective so far in reducing 
poverty in Africa.
503
 It was also mentioned that Western donors have acknowledged the limits 
faced by their development assistance approach and for this reason they have conducted 
several international summits and actions to address those challenges.
504
 Although China was 
not a member to these various international summits, it had been willing to join traditional 
donors in their resolutions, for instance, by implementing some of their resolutions, such as, 
granting debt relief to Cameroon under the HIPC Initiative Agreement, and by aligning their 
development assistance approach following Cameroon priorities as decided under the Paris 
Declaration of Aid Effectiveness.
505
 Thus, it was finally concluded that the creation of a new 
multilateral legal framework including China, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) donors, the IMF and the World Bank would be a better approach 
for Cameroon economic development.
506
 In so doing it was recommended that the new 
multilateral legal framework also incorporate both the positive legal aspects of each donor 
country.
507
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5.2 Recommendations 
 
Due to the limited ability of the HIPC Initiative Agreement to address effectively the long-
lasting poverty and economic development issues of developing countries for decades, the 
following recommendations were made: first, the IMF and the World Bank should take steps 
to make appropriate resources available for funding the development priorities of HIPCs and 
other poor countries, and ensure that HIPC debt relief is really additional to other aid flows; 
secondly, they should rigorously evaluate and monitor the outcomes of the HIPC Initiative in 
each specific HIPC in order  to make both debtor and creditor countries accountable; and 
lastly it was emphasised the need for the active participation of the entire international 
community, particularly of the recipient countries which are best placed to internally 
implement suitable economic policies and institutions to foster their economic 
development.
508
  
 
Moreover, given the limited effectiveness of China’s White Paper on Foreign to address 
poverty issues and economic development in Cameroon as well, some recommendations were 
made.
509
 For instance, it was suggested that China urgently conform to all the international 
legal instruments relative to international co-operation, the Beijing Declaration of the Forum 
on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) and the White Paper on Foreign Aid. Thus, it was 
recommended that China addresses the challenges regarding its technology transfer by 
empowering Cameroon local firms in construction projects at the top level.
510
 With regard to 
the criticism that China’s linking of aid to procurement negatively impacted on Cameroon 
local industries’ economic prosperity and does not promote technology transfer as well, it 
was suggested that China purchases all construction materials in Cameroon, make Chinese 
construction projects a local business run by Cameroonian companies, and empower them at 
the top level of these projects so as to enable them to acquire all the necessary technical 
skills.
511
 Regarding human rights violations, it was recommended that China urgently 
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conforms to all the international human rights instruments.
512
 Furthermore, it was 
recommended that China revisit its development assistance approach’s framework in order to 
enhance its transparency, its monitoring and evaluation system in such a way as to increase 
its effectiveness in both Cameroon and Africa. 
 
Given the fact that both approaches have proved themselves limited and that they 
complement each one, it was concluded that the creation of a new multilateral legal 
framework incorporating the positive aspects of the OECD donors, China’s White Paper on 
Foreign Aid as well as those of the HIPC Initiative Agreement would be a better approach for 
Cameroon in particular and for Africa in general. In so doing, it was suggested that regarding 
the IMF and the World Bank debt reduction approach the following legal aspects should be 
retained: respect for human rights and dignity; and transparency of the development 
assistance and the monitoring and evaluation system. 
513
 Furthermore, it was also suggested 
that the five principles of aid effectiveness proclaimed by the IMF, the World Bank and the 
OECD countries should be advocated, namely: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results 
and mutual accountability. With regard to China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid, it was 
recommended that the following legal aspects should be maintained: the five principles of 
peaceful co-existence, respect for State sovereignty, respect of the principle of non-
interference, non-imposition of political conditionalities, respect of the principle of equality, 
and mutual benefit in international cooperation.
514
 
 
Finally, it was concluded that the achievement of effective poverty reduction and economic 
development in African countries can only be met if donors and recipient countries 
collaborate and implement appropriate macro-economic reforms. 
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